III.3.3 An Enhanced Ability?

Experience suggests that the relevant negotiations in the Council are always overshadowed by the possibility of a vote. Hence, ministers and civil servants must at all times consider the risk of a marginalised minority position.

The conditions for a qualified majority, as specified in the Treaty of Nice, substantially lowered the average statistical risk of being outvoted in an historic comparison. Put differently, on the basis of mathematical calculations, the probability of securing a constructive qualified majority has been significantly reduced, as compared to the criteria previously in place. The rules agreed in the TCE would, conversely, change the odds in favour of a constructive majority [Graphic]. The statistically derived range of voting combinations does not therefore determine the behaviour of the actors in the Council, as can be shown by the effects of the Luxembourg compromise on the standard of unanimity between 1966 and 1986. Assuming, however, that voting is indeed a possibility to be expected, as the last decades of practical experience have established, politicians and officials will seek a predictable long-term strategy of either reaching a blocking minority, or qualified majorities. With view to such coalitions, which clearly illustrate the possibilities for preventing majorities, the political consequences of the new rules of decision making in the Council should be discussed with view to the respective weight of Member States. Employing statistical models, calculations show that the shifts of potential votes between the member states are of major significance [Graphic].

Compared to the system of weighted votes of the Union Treaty of Nice, the balance of power is leaning towards the bigger, and more highly populated, member states. The parity of votes between Germany and France, which had been fiercely defended by President Chirac at the Nice summit, changes in favour of Germany; the status as 'almost' big states, which Spain and Poland had achieved, will be rolled back again. Particularly the medium-sized nations of around 10 million inhabitants stand to lose. The agreed formula of a "double majority", by contrast, will make Germany a comparative winner - even under the additional condition of the fourth country needed for the blocking majority: her weight has increased by more than that of all other large states put together. A blocking minority can be achieved quite easily by the federal government, provided it has standing arrangements with the other big members together with an additional small one. Under the impression of such a remarkable power shift, the German Chancellor has agreed to a subtraction of three German seats in the European Parliament. Nevertheless, in order to win a constructive majority, Germany will require a broad coalition. All in all, the Constitutional Treaty demands large constructive majorities in the Council: the offered opportunities to anhance the Union's ability to take action are small when compared to the demand for the high threshold for approval or indeed blocking minorities [Table].

 

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