

# **Integrated Yet Alienated: Ethnic Minority Political Participation in Britain and France**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Academic theory explains low levels of immigrant ethnic minority political participation largely through structural variables. As such, when ethnic minorities achieve better socio-economic and cultural assimilation outcomes, they are expected to participate more. However, the evidence is to the contrary. In Britain and France the ethnic minorities with the highest socio-economic levels and most cultural assimilation are also the groups that participate the least. To explain this paradox I use previously unexploited survey data to develop turnout models that highlight the importance of attitudes and social alienation for predicting turnout.

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## *Introduction*

One of the central questions for political science is why some individuals participate in politics more than others. And, as societies become more complex, these questions become more confusing. When national, ethnic, religious, class, and regional identities and interests intersect, it becomes increasingly difficult to isolate single determinants of behavior, political or otherwise.

Traditionally political scientists have explained political participation with universal voting models that apply the same range of factors to the entire population: demographics (e.g. social class, income, education, age, gender), social networks (e.g. employment status, marital status, residential status, social identification, mobilization by political actors), and attitudes (e.g. partisanship, political and social trust, sense of self-efficacy, democratic values). However, in recent studies of immigrant ethnic minority political participation, political scientists have questioned whether or not ethnic minorities share the same motivating factors as the white majority.

Those who argue that voting turnout models apply equally to all groups usually claim that lower political participation among first-generation immigrants is easily attributable to demographic and institutional factors directly related to the migration process such as access to voting rights and citizenship, length of stay in host country, and familiarity with host country language, culture, and customs (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Therefore, as ethnic minorities become more integrated, i.e. enjoy better educational and occupational outcomes, establish deeper ties in the community, and develop more interest in domestic affairs, they will inevitably participate more in politics (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare 2004).

However, when one approaches the empirical cases of England and France, the ethnic minority with higher socio-economic status (higher class backgrounds, higher education levels) and better acculturation (easier institutional access to voting rights, less contact with their home countries, and greater cultural assimilation than other ethnic minorities) also has the lowest levels of turnout. To explain this paradox one cannot therefore rely on a general model that assumes linear integration processes, but rather one must look closer at the group specific subtleties of integration. As such, I argue that attitudinal factors such as alienation are essential for understanding why certain groups participate more than others.

### *Ethnic Minority Political Participation: Diverging Trends*

Britain and France are particularly well suited for comparing ethnic political participation. Both countries are former empires that received diverse post-colonial migrants after WWII, including non-Christians from highly-stigmatized and discriminated-against colonial populations (South Asians in England and Maghrebians in France) as well as “model minority” black Caribbean populations with socio-economic and cultural integration advantages upon arrival. Therefore, according to socio-economic

status and cultural assimilation political participation arguments, in each country blacks should have higher participation than other ethnic groups. However, as Table 1 shows, the opposite has been the case.

*Table 1: Vote Turnout in Britain and France*

| <b>1997 British General Election</b> |  |                     |                  |                   | <b>2004 French European Parliament Elections</b> | <b>2004 French Regional Elections – Round 1</b> | <b>2004 French Regional Elections – Round 2</b> |          |
|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|------------------|-------------------|--|---|---|----------|
|                                      | <b>Turnout % Among Registered Voters</b> | <b>% Registered</b> | <b>Overall N</b> |                   | <b>Turnout % Among Registered Voters</b>         | <b>Turnout % Among Registered Voters</b>        | <b>Turnout % Among Registered Voters</b>        | <b>N</b> |
| <b>Whites</b>                        | 81.14                                    | 97.22               | 3,453            | <b>Whites</b>     | 45.61  | 66.27   | 69.85   | 21,476   |
| <b>S. Asians</b>                     | 83.65                                    | 94.19               | 396              | <b>Spanish</b>    | 44.73  | 65.81   | 67.73   | 313      |
| <b>Bang/Pak</b>                      | 80.89                                    | 90.93               | 169              | <b>Italian</b>    | 42.05  | 63.83   | 66.45   | 459      |
| <b>Indians</b>                       | 84.55                                    | 96.92               | 227              | <b>Polish</b>     | 36.91  | 62.42   | 59.06   | 142      |
| <b>Blacks Total</b>                  | 72.15                                    | 92.58               | 256              | <b>Portuguese</b> | 34.39  | 56.69   | 58.60   | 157      |
| <b>Caribbean</b>                     | 70.92                                    | 95.92               | 147              | <b>Maghrebian</b> | 29.81  | 50.14   | 55.56   | 369      |
| <b>Africans</b>                      | 73.86                                    | 87.13               | 101              | <b>Caribbean</b>  | 25.22  | 46.52   | 53.48   | 230      |

Source: 1997 British Election Study, 2004 Electoral Participation Study, 1999 French Population Census, 2003 Longitudinal Demographic Study

While blacks in Britain are the least likely to vote and remain severely underrepresented in government, South Asians are more likely to vote than whites, in many districts have elected local councillors equal to their percentage of the local population (Anwar 1994, 1998, 2001; Le Lohé 1982, 1990; Saggar 1998a), and while all ethnic minorities remain underrepresented on the national level, South Asians have been more successful than blacks.

Caribbeans in France are also less likely to vote in comparison with white French people and other immigrants and ethnic minorities. While Maghrebians have not achieved the political successes of South Asians in Britain, they do vote at consistently higher rates than Caribbeans, and have greater representation in government across all levels.

The literature that attempts to explain turnout variation in Britain and France focuses on socio-economic resources and dense social networks as key explanations. However, I contend that these arguments are insensitive to the unique experiences of ethnic minorities, and therefore miss the important attitudinal factors that impact political behavior above and beyond socio-economic resources and social networks.

While South Asians as a whole have high participation rates in Britain, when analyzing turnout nuances it is important to distinguish between secular Hindu Indians with higher-than-average socio-economic status and religious Muslim Bangladeshis and Pakistanis with lower-than-average socio-economic status.

To explain why Indians in Britain vote more than blacks the literature usually claims that educational and occupational success has led to Indian engagement with

mainstream British institutions (Modood and Berthoud 1997) and therefore a commitment to voting (Geddes 1998b: 42, Saggar 1998b). However, despite the importance of socio-economic variables for participation, my regression analysis will show that significant turnout differences exist between Indians and Caribbeans even when controlling for education and occupation, and therefore, one must seek other explanations for the turnout gap.

To explain why Bangladeshis and Pakistanis vote more than blacks the literature argues that Islam has served as a unifying factor that builds dense social networks, social capital, civic engagement and political participation (Adolino 1998: 37-38, Garbaye 2001, Glynn 2002, Joly 1997, Kepele 1994, Modood 2005: 467-68). However, while it is clear that Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims in Britain have been more ethnically organized than black Caribbeans, it is not necessarily clear that strong Muslim networks should lead to greater participation than the more culturally integrated networks that Caribbeans enjoy. Therefore in this paper I will test whether culturally integrated and/or segregated networks are more important for turnout, concluding that while networks are important, they do not explain the difference between Bangladeshis-Pakistanis as much as attitudes and social alienation.

In France there has been very little rigorous analysis of ethnic vote turnout, largely because there are very few quantitative data on the subject. Most work has explained why Maghrebians participate less than whites, and argues that with increasing socio-economic levels, more Maghrebian acceptance of French values, and more white French social acceptance of Maghrebians, the political behavior of Maghrebians will cease to be distinctive (Geisser and Kelfaoui 1998). While there is some evidence to support these claims when comparing Maghrebians to whites, these arguments do nothing to explain why Caribbeans consistently vote less than Maghrebians, despite having higher socio-economic levels and despite being more culturally integrated, i.e. being members of the French republic for hundreds of years, more likely to intermarry with whites, and more likely to be Catholic (Anselin 1990).

While I do not deny the importance of socio-economic resources and cultural integration for political participation, I argue they do not fully explain turnout patterns among ethnic minorities because they do not capture the important psychological dimensions of ethnic minority life. I argue that attitudinal factors such as social alienation are crucial to understand, for what they reveal about the various integration processes across ethnic groups.

### *Data*

While there have been numerous qualitative studies of ethnic political behavior in Britain and France (Le Lohé 1982, 1990, 1998, Geisser 1997, Saggar 1998a, 1998b, Wihtol de Wenden 1988) there is a dearth of quantitative analysis offering solid evidence for general trends.

My British data come from the 1997 British Election Survey (BES) which

included an ethnic minority booster sample of 705 individuals. To date this is the largest and most representative survey of ethnic minority political behavior across Britain, which therefore allows comparison among ethnic groups.

Other options to the BES include the 1997 General Election survey conducted by Muhammad Anwar with a larger sample size of 3,232 of which more than two-thirds were ethnic minorities. Unfortunately Anwar's study focused only on five parliamentary constituencies, leading to results that exaggerate or diminish national-level trends (Anwar 2001:539). The 2001 MORI survey conducted by The Electoral Commission is another more recent option, but it has an ethnic minority sample size of under 300 which merely allows for comparison between whites and non-whites.

Due to the small sample size of many political behavior surveys in Britain, quantitative analysis of voting behavior has been limited to comparisons between whites and non-whites, glossing over what I argue are essential differences among non-white groups. There is evidence that important distinctions exist between black Caribbeans and black Africans, as well as among Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis, but unfortunately the BES does not have a large enough sample size to compare these all of these groups. However, analyzing some of the major differences, between Caribbeans and Indians and Caribbeans and Bangladeshis/Pakistanis, is an important step forward.

Ethnic data in France are even more difficult to acquire due to the strict government adherence to universal republican values and monopoly on data collection. However, the Longitudinal Demographic Study (EDP) allows identification of second-generation ethnic minorities via the variables for parents' department/country of birth and parents' nationality. The EDP started in 1968 and followed a sample of 1% of the population, in this case individuals born on the first four days of October. In-depth demographic information was collected on these individuals and everyone in their household, i.e. parents and children. Only recently has the EDP been combined with the Electoral Participation Study (EPE) to allow analysis of voting behavior (Richard 1998, 2004) and many important questions remain. In particular, while much attention has been given to differences among Maghrebians, native whites, and other European immigrant groups, almost no attention has been paid to Caribbean voting behavior.

#### *Results: Traditional Assumptions Do Not Have the Right Attitudes*

Traditional assumptions claim socio-economic resources and social networks explain ethnic political participation, but the data clearly show otherwise, prompting us to take more seriously the impact of attitudes and social alienation.

#### Britain

Model 1 in Table 1 of Appendix 2 clearly shows that despite claims that Indian socio-economic success is the reason for high turnout, the Indian/Caribbean dummy variable remains significant even when controlling for education, income, and employment. This means that different turnout rates between Indians and Caribbeans cannot be explained merely by education, income, and employment levels. Model 2 goes

further to show that even when controlling for numerous measures of socio-economic status (income, education, employment), social networks (age, marital status, length of residence), political involvement (interest in politics, mobilization by political actors, feeling thermometer for Labour Party), and attitudes towards ethnic segregation (ethnic identification, opinion on integration) the ethnic difference remains significant for predicting turnout. Finally, Model 3 presents “political trust” as the crucial variable that erases the significance of ethnic difference, and therefore points to social alienation as a crucial explanation for turnout differences.

Models 4, 5, and 6 test the importance of social network variables for explaining Caribbean and Bangladeshi/Pakistani turnout differentials. And, while ethnic differences remain significant even when controlling for mobilization by political actors and length of residence, when controlling for religiosity the ethnic difference is no longer significant. This seems to support the literature on the importance of religious mobilization for Bangladeshi and Pakistani political participation, but closer analysis of turnout by ethnic group will be necessary to determine specific motivating factors.

Table 2 in Appendix 2 presents turnout models by ethnicity, and shows that when a variety of socio-economic, social network, political mobilization, and attitudinal variables are controlled for, Caribbeans are most likely to vote when they identify as British instead of ethnic, Indians are most likely to vote when they are interested in politics, and Bangladeshis/Pakistanis are most likely to vote when they have lived longer in the same neighborhood. So, contrary to the general wisdom in the literature, socio-economic resources and ethnic religious social networks do not stand out as the most prominent explanations.

Instead, one must look to attitudes and alienation for a better explanation of turnout variation. The fact that Caribbeans are most likely to vote when they identify as British instead of ethnic is especially telling because in the BES data Caribbeans are also the least likely to identify as British. This very disjuncture between the Caribbean advantage on “objective/structural” measures of cultural integration (i.e. religion, cultural habits, intermarriage) and the Caribbean disadvantage on attitudinal/psychological measures of social integration will explain the nuances of our voting turnout paradox.

### France

The literature on French ethnic minority turnout expects participation to increase as socio-economic levels increase. However, Tables 1-6 in Appendix 3 clearly show that socio-economic status is not the most important factor. These tables present logistic regression results that test the significance of differences among individual educational and occupational categories. The only educational difference that is significant is the comparison between no diploma and higher education for Maghrebians, and the only occupational status difference that is significant is the comparison between students and professionals for Caribbeans. Clearly more complex and nuanced models are necessary to understand specific ethnic group voting behavior.

Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix 3 present full voting model results for Caribbeans,

Maghrebians, white French, Spanish, Italians, Polish, and Portuguese. These results show that variables for cultural integration (age, length of residence, marriage) are very important for turnout among the white immigrant groups and Maghrebians, but less so for Caribbeans and native French whites. This leads us to believe that while white immigrant groups and Maghrebians require acculturation to France before participating in politics, white French and Caribbeans face other determinants of participation. Which makes sense because white immigrants and Maghrebians are immigrants from foreign countries and by definition must adjust to France, whereas Caribbeans and native white French were born French, were born acculturated to France, and understandably have different motivation factors compared to immigrants.

Table 7 shows that for Maghrebians the biggest predictor of vote across elections is age, which is most likely a crude proxy for various processes related to migration status. The bivariate for age that breaks down significance by age group shows that across elections, 46-60 year olds were the most likely to vote, followed by 61-80 year olds, 81 and older, 30-45 year olds, and 19-29 year olds. This is skewed slightly younger than the typical voting pattern where 61-80 year olds are the most likely to vote, which is understandable when one considers the specific colonial history in North Africa.

61-80 year old Maghrebians were born between 1924 and 1943 and are most likely immigrants who left North Africa to escape economic or political difficulties. As such, their primary goals in France were to construct a new life and earn money to support a family with low paying jobs, so French politics were understandably not central. 46-60 year olds were born between 1944 and 1968, i.e. in the midst of North African decolonization, and were more likely to either be born in France or have immigrated with their parents at a young age. Therefore, 46-60 year old political participation is likely to be the result of more cultural integration through having spent greater percentages of their lives in France, as well as belonging to an exceptionally politicized generation, like many of the white European “68ers” (Weil 2002).

So, while acculturation and migration dynamics appear to be crucial for predicting Maghrebian turnout, Caribbeans are more likely to vote when older, better educated, male, and not living in a strong left wing department. While age is also important for Caribbeans, it is not nearly as significant across categories in the bivariate case as it was for Maghrebians, and more likely reflects the higher participation among older people. The more interesting Caribbean result is the negative effect of living in strong left wing departments.

The fact that Caribbeans are less likely to vote in departments where the left wing is strong suggests that they are alienated from their most likely political allies, and as such are alienated from the political system in general. This is even more significant when compared with other ethnic groups, as the political party variables are also significant for white French people, but for none of the other groups (save one election where a strong FN reduces Polish turnout). This gives further support to the claim that for white European ethnic minorities and Maghrebians political participation is primarily a matter of becoming acculturated to French society. Whereas, for white French and

Caribbeans who are already acculturated, there are more likely to be attitudinal and psychological determinants at work, leading us to more closely examine social alienation to explain our French voting paradox.

### *Alienation Proceeds In Perverse Ways*

Studying attitudes and alienation has a long history in general US political participation research (starting with the classic Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960), as well as in the more specific ethnic minority research. Early US ethnic minority research showed that when controlling for education and social class African-Americans participated more than whites (Verba and Nie 1972), and explained this phenomenon by either a need to compensate for social exclusion (Orum 1966), or the benefits of a community that encouraged public involvement (Dawson 1995, Nelson 1979). While psychological and attitudinal determinants of participation have been used in European research (see van der Eijk and Frank 1996 for a recent overview), they have not yet penetrated European ethnic minority voting research. The exact reasons for this oversight are unclear, although it is likely related to the fact that ethnic minorities in Europe are largely considered outsiders who must integrate into local cultures, so research has focused on tracking and explaining this integration. However, the above data have shown us that the general wisdom on ethnic minority political participation overemphasizes an objective “structural” integration via socio-economic resources and cultural assimilation, and has missed subtler psychological forms of societal alienation.

I argue that to fully understand the paradox of why culturally integrated and socio-economically advantaged black Caribbeans vote less than other immigrant groups one must consider the social alienation that has emerged in recent decades. This social alienation is primarily a result of generational change and time-period dynamics that started after the economic crisis of 1973 and have accelerated to this day. The three main components of this social alienation are a) increased racial discrimination, b) higher expectations, c) less cultural identity to fall back on.

The first key dynamic contributing to increased alienation among blacks in Britain and France is the increased racial discrimination experienced by blacks over the past two decades, which has both economic and social sources. Migrants first arrived during the 1950s and 60s when there was a labor shortage, but, in the 1980s and 90s competition for jobs has been much more tighter. As a result of the increased competition, ethnic minorities have been easily targeted as outside interlopers, and as ethnic minorities are less likely to have access to privileged networks in Europe they have been targets of discrimination on the job market (Robinson and Valeny 2005: 423). This in turn has naturally led to feelings of alienation and estrangement among ethnic minorities. However while the increased competition affects all ethnic minorities on a general level, it impacts different groups differently.

First generation blacks in Britain and France were considered “model minorities” (Anselin 1990, Nanton 1999) and were privileged in comparison to other ethnic minorities. So, while other ethnicities were inured to brutal discrimination from the

beginning of their stay, blacks have been less accustomed to it, and therefore more likely to respond with heightened alienation as a result of recent trends. In addition, with the increasing diversity and volume of immigrants, culturally integrated blacks are more easily confused with lower-status recent immigrants. So, despite intermarriage, cultural habits, and religious observances that may make blacks more “objectively” integrated on a personal level, when they are subject to increased discrimination in the public sphere, they are increasingly likely to become alienated (Giraud 2004, Peach 2005).

The second dynamic contributing to increased alienation is the higher expectations that have come with time, which is largely a generational effect. While first generation blacks had higher status than other ethnic minorities, they were still largely filtered into disfavored low-level public sector positions. Those positions may have been better than their options in the Caribbean, but their children are born in Europe, expect as much success as their white European peers, and are therefore more likely to resent discrimination that separates them from their white peers. In addition, while first-generation blacks may have suffered from disfavored jobs they were able to console themselves with being one notch above other ethnic minorities. However, because South Asians and Maghrebians started from more disadvantaged positions they have been able to make more dramatic socio-economic advances across generations, whereas Caribbeans in both countries had higher starting points, and with an increasingly squeezed labor market have found it more difficult to advance (Giraud 2004: 627, Heath and McMahan 2005: 412, Robinson and Valeny 2005: 428-9), leading to increased frustration. The second generation has also grown up sharing disfavored ghettos with other ethnic minorities, has fewer homeland references to distinguish themselves, and when facing more discrimination than their parents did, is less likely to feel like a “model minority” and more likely to feel heightened social alienation.

Finally, the third dynamic leading to increased social alienation among black Caribbeans in Europe is the fact that they have fewer cultural resources around which they can ethnically organize and protect themselves from discrimination. Caribbean societies were formed by Europeans through the violent process of slavery, and as such have very little symbolic or traditional history to access outside of European involvement. India and the Maghreb on the other hand have thousands of years of history and numerous cultural, religious, and historical traditions that can be drawn on to ethnically organize in opposition to European discrimination. In addition, while British and French colonialism in the Caribbean was much more invasive and penetrated deeper into society, colonialism in South Asia and the Maghreb remained primarily economic, allowing greater freedom for local cultures and traditions to thrive/survive (Brock 1986, Carnegie 1987, Hiro 1991: 107-109, 113).

This does not deny that South Asian and Maghrebian ethnic organization in Europe has been constructed and is far from primordially inevitable. However, it does suggest that South Asians and Maghrebians have had more potential cultural, historical, symbolic, and especially religious symbols, around which they can bond and organize in opposition to European racism (Samad 1996: 92-94). This potential for ethnic unity has political and economic ramifications. Politically, South Asian and Maghrebian voter

turnout and pressure groups have been stronger than those of Caribbeans. Economically, the heightened discrimination that South Asians and Caribbeans have faced has made them more likely to become self-employed and self-sufficient entrepreneurs, whereas Caribbeans have relied on public sector employment and have had fewer networks to provide jobs as alternatives to the discriminatory white-controlled job market (Pilkington 2003: 135-45). While there have been numerous attempts to organize black Caribbean identity politically and economically in both Britain and France, with various success stories, these efforts have resulted in fewer concessions from the respective governments, evidenced most clearly by the smaller percentages of elected and appointed officials as mentioned above.

So, the cultural integration of blacks has paradoxically gone hand in hand with increased social alienation, due to increased discrimination, higher expectations, and weaker cultural identity. And therefore, regardless of individual socio-economic or cultural integration status, the increasing social alienation of blacks in Britain and France has led to lower political participation.

#### *Conclusion: A Nuanced Perspective on Group Divergence*

The central problem with research on ethnic minority political participation in Europe is that it has too long posed the problem in terms of acculturation to the host country. This can in part be traced to the particular European tradition of viewing the nation-state as already formed before 20<sup>th</sup> century immigration, and therefore viewing immigrants as outsiders that by definition must adapt/integrate (Favell 2001). As a result of this integrationist perspective, attitudes and psychological issues that impact political participation above and beyond structural integration measures have been ignored.

Understanding the social alienation that has increased among blacks in Britain and France therefore allows us to better understand their lower voting rates despite having higher socio-economic status and cultural integration in comparison with other ethnic minorities. While this does not necessarily point to a positive or encouraging trend in the future, it does help us to better understand a growing problem, and gives us clues about what can be done to fix the problem.

Focusing on the structural integration indicators of socio-economic status and cultural assimilation will not solve the problem, because even with middle-class jobs and white spouses, blacks are experiencing alienation. The statistical models in this paper suggest that for the moment other non-black ethnic minorities have been benefiting from structural integration and are engaged in European political life as a result. However, if discrimination and ethnic divisions remain prominent despite these structural integration advances, it is likely that social alienation and discontent will spread in future decades.

So, European societies need to be more aware of the already-present diversity that is fracturing their societies. The pursuit of homogenous unity is a 19<sup>th</sup> century myth that only contributes to the alienation of citizens with different phenotypes from the majority.

To move past ethnic discrimination and promote full civic participation across complex identities and interests, European countries will need to develop better educational curriculums that truly acknowledge their diverse histories (Weil 2005), and chip away at the entrenched discrimination black Caribbeans face despite all their seeming integration advantages.

## **Appendix 1: Description of Variables**

### **British Election Study**

*Carib/Indian*: 0: Caribbean, 1: Indian

*Carib/Bang-Pak*: 0: Caribbean, 1: Bangladeshi or Pakistani

*Income*: Total household annual income: 1 – 16 in increments of £3,000

*Education*: Highest level of education

0: no qualification, 1: foreign or other, 2: CSE, 3: O level, 4: A level  
5: higher education below degree, 6: degree

*Employed*: 0: Active, 1: Student, Disabled, Housewife, or Unemployed

*Age*: 18 – 97, in years

*Length of Residence*: “How long have you lived in neighborhood?” 0 – 48, in years

*Marry*: “Are you married?” 0: no, 1: yes

*Gender*: 0: male, 1: female

*Mobilized*: “Were you contacted by a political party during the election?” 0: No, 1: Yes

*Interest in Politics*: “How much interest do you have in politics?”

0: none, 1: not very much, 2: some, 3: quite a lot, 4: a great deal

*Labour FT*: “What is your feeling about the Labour Party?”

0: strongly against, 1: against, 2: neither, 3: in favor, 4: strongly in favor

*Ethnic ID*: “Do you think of yourself as more ethnic or British?”

0: British, not ethnic, 1: more British than ethnic, 2: Equal,  
3: more ethnic than British, 4: ethnic not British

*Integrate*: “Should minorities integrate culturally?” 0: no, 1: yes

*Pol Trust*: “How much do you trust government to act in the interests of society and not their party?”

0: almost never, 1: some of the time, 2: most of the time, 3: just about always

*Religiosity*: “How religious are you nowadays?”

0: not at all religious, 1: not very religious, 2: somewhat religious, 3: very religious

**French Electoral Participation Study**

*Social Class*: 0: Students, 1: Unemployed, 2: Agriculture, 3: Manual Laborers, 4: Employees, 5: Self employed/artisans, 6: White collar administrative, 7: Professionals

*Education*: 0: No diploma, 1: Grammar school, 1: High school, 2: Higher education

*Employed*: 0: Active, 1: Unemployed, retired, student

*Gender*: 0: Male, 1: Female

*Age*: 0: 19-29 years old, 1: 30 -45 years old, 2: 46 - 60 years old, 3: 61 - 80 years old, 4 : 81 plus

*Married*: 0: Married, 1: Not Married

*5 Years Residence*: 0: commune of registration in 2004 is the same as commune of registration in 1999, 1: commune of registration in 2004 not the same as commune of registration in 1999

*Residence Since Birth*: 0: commune of registration in 2004 is the same as commune of birth, 1: commune of registration in 2004 is not the same as commune of birth

*Urban*: commune of registration is: 0: rural, 1: less than 5000 inhabitants, 2: 5 - 9,999 inhabitants, 3: 10,000 - 19,999 inhabitants, 4: 20,000 - 49,999 inhabitants, 5: 50,000 - 99,999 inhabitants, 6: 100,000 - 199,999 inhabitants, 7: 200,000 - 1,999,999 inhabitants, 8: Paris

*ZUS*: “Do you live in a ZUS” (Sensitive Urban Zone: i.e. government classified highly disadvantaged neighborhood): 0: No, 1: Yes

*Far Right EU*: Percentage of Votes for the FN in 2004 EU Elections in the Individuals' Department of Residence: 0: 0 - 9.99%, 1: 10 - 14.99%, 2: 15 – 19.99%, 3: 20% and up

*Far Left EU: Percentage of Votes for the Communist Party and the Extreme Left in 2004 EU Elections in the Individuals' Department of Residence: 0: 0 - 4.99%, 1: 5 - 9.99%, 2: 10 - 19.99%, 3: 20 and up*

*Far Right Region. R1: Percentage of Votes for the FN in the First Round of 2004 Regional Elections in the Individual's Department of Residence: 0: 0 - 9.99%, 1: 10 - 14.99%, 2: 15 - 19.99%, 3: 20% and up*

*Far Left Region. R1: Percentage of Votes for the Communist Party and the Extreme Left in the First Round of 2004 Regional Elections in the Individuals' Department of Residence: 0: 0 - 4.99%, 1: 5 - 9.99%, 2: 10 - 19.99%, 3: 20 and up*

*Far Right Region. R2: Percentage of Votes for the FN in the Second Round of 2004 Regional Elections in the Individual's Department of Residence: 0: 0 - 9.99%, 1: 10 - 14.99%, 2: 15 - 19.99%, 3: 20% and up*

*Left Wing Region. R2: Percentage of Votes for the Left Wing in the Second Round of 2004 Regional Elections in the Individuals' Department of Residence: 0: 30 - 39.99%, 1: 40 - 44.99%, 2: 45 - 49.99%, 3: 50 - 54.99%, 4: 55 and up*

## Appendix II: Tables for British Regressions

*Table 1: Logistic Regression for Turnout (0 - No Vote 1 - Vote)*

|                                 | <b>I</b>         | <b>II</b>        | <b>III</b>      | <b>IV</b>       | <b>V</b>        | <b>VI</b>      |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <b>Carib/<br/>Indian</b>        | .769*<br>(.307)  | .896*<br>(.430)  | .863<br>(.454)  |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Carib/<br/>Bang-Pak</b>      |                  |                  |                 | .652*<br>(.282) | .713*<br>(.289) | .512<br>(.294) |
| <b>Income</b>                   | .163**<br>(.055) | .125*<br>(.058)  | .137*<br>(.062) |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Education</b>                | -.037<br>(.082)  | .075<br>(.106)   | .084<br>(.109)  |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Employed</b>                 | .524<br>(.369)   | .258<br>(.411)   | .205<br>(.426)  |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Age</b>                      |                  | .025<br>(.016)   | .024<br>(.017)  |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Length of<br/>Residence</b>  |                  | .042<br>(.021)   | .047*<br>(.022) |                 | .051<br>(.017)  |                |
| <b>Marry</b>                    |                  | .530<br>(.432)   | .328<br>(.452)  |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Gender</b>                   |                  | -.739*<br>(.369) | -.571<br>(.384) |                 |                 |                |
| <b>Mobilized</b>                |                  | -.132<br>(.390)  | -.089<br>(.413) | -.062<br>(.286) |                 |                |
| <b>Interest in<br/>Politics</b> |                  | .445*<br>(.188)  | .416*<br>(.196) |                 |                 |                |

|                        |      |                 |                  |     |     |                |
|------------------------|------|-----------------|------------------|-----|-----|----------------|
| <b>Labour FT</b>       |      | .594*<br>(.232) | .649**<br>(.247) |     |     |                |
| <b>Ethnic ID</b>       |      | .049<br>(.231)  | .113<br>(.384)   |     |     |                |
| <b>Integrate</b>       |      | .177<br>(.369)  | .113<br>(.384)   |     |     |                |
| <b>Political Trust</b> |      |                 | .285<br>(.250)   |     |     |                |
| <b>Religiosity</b>     |      |                 |                  |     |     | .209<br>(.148) |
| <b>N</b>               | 291  | 262             | 243              | 294 | 289 | 288            |
| <b>Pseudo R2</b>       | 0.07 | 0.20            | 0.21             | .02 | .05 | .02            |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

Table 2: Logistic Regression for Turnout (0 – No Vote 1 – Vote)

|                             | <b>Caribbeans</b>              | <b>Indians</b>                | <b>Bang/<br/>Pakistani</b>    | <b>Whites</b>                   |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>Income</b>               | .177<br>(.105)                 | .145<br>(.085)                | .045<br>(.112)                | .029<br>(.016)                  |
| <b>Education</b>            | .186<br>(.201)                 | .007<br>(.156)                | -.286<br>(.153)               | .043<br>(.029)                  |
| <b>Employed</b>             | .930<br>(.739)                 | -.039<br>(.583)               | -.244<br>(.744)               | .056<br>(.129)                  |
| <b>Age</b>                  | .023<br>(.029)                 | .038<br>(.026)                | -.026<br>(.028)               | <b>.017***</b><br><b>(.004)</b> |
| <b>Length of Residence</b>  | .053<br>(.031)                 | .035<br>(.040)                | <b>.089*</b><br><b>(.041)</b> | <b>.016***</b><br><b>(.004)</b> |
| <b>Marry</b>                | -.243<br>(.729)                | .503<br>(.655)                | .406<br>(.697)                | <b>.443***</b><br><b>(.111)</b> |
| <b>Gender</b>               | -.574<br>(.617)                | -.811<br>(.573)               | -.108<br>(.657)               | <b>-.297**</b><br><b>(.107)</b> |
| <b>Mobilized</b>            | -.611<br>(.614)                | .887<br>(.660)                | -.119<br>(.598)               | <b>.363**</b><br><b>(.129)</b>  |
| <b>Interest in Politics</b> | .042<br>(.2989)                | <b>.676*</b><br><b>(.291)</b> | -.089<br>(.278)               | <b>.512***</b><br><b>(.056)</b> |
| <b>Labour FT</b>            | .404<br>(.377)                 | .599<br>(.356)                | -.039<br>(.383)               | <b>.178***</b><br><b>(.051)</b> |
| <b>Political Trust</b>      | .512<br>(.394)                 | -.029<br>(.376)               | .517<br>(.395)                | <b>.359***</b><br><b>(.079)</b> |
| <b>Religiosity</b>          | .286<br>(.280)                 | -.132<br>(.325)               | .417<br>(.371)                | .062<br>(.060)                  |
| <b>Ethnic ID</b>            | <b>-.815*</b><br><b>(.378)</b> | .735<br>(.375)                | -.093<br>(.335)               |                                 |
| <b>N</b>                    | 102                            | 158                           | 103                           | 2827                            |

|                  |      |      |      |      |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|
| <b>Pseudo R2</b> | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.11 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

### Appendix III: Tables for French Regressions

*Table 1: Bivariate Logistic Regression on Education for Probability of Caribbean Vote (Reference category: Higher education)*

|                       | <b>EU Elections</b> | <b>04 1<sup>st</sup> Round Reg.</b> | <b>04 2<sup>nd</sup> Round Reg.</b> |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>No Diploma</b>     | .382<br>(.436)      | .316<br>(.419)                      | -.129<br>(.415)                     |
| <b>Grammar School</b> | -.471<br>(.262)     | -.315<br>(.226)                     | -.087<br>(.224)                     |
| <b>High School</b>    | -.262<br>(.283)     | -.231<br>(.249)                     | -.129<br>(.247)                     |
| <b>N</b>              | 230                 | 230                                 | 230                                 |
| <b>AIC</b>            | 261.993             | 322.188                             | 323.508                             |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

*Table 2: Bivariate Logistic Regression on Education for Probability of Maghrebian Vote (Reference category: Higher education)*

|                       | <b>EU Elections</b>            | <b>04 1<sup>st</sup> Round Reg.</b> | <b>04 2<sup>nd</sup> Round Reg.</b> |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>No Diploma</b>     | <b>.748**</b><br><b>(.242)</b> | .387<br>(.243)                      | <b>.617*</b><br><b>(.261)</b>       |
| <b>Grammar School</b> | -.277<br>(.181)                | .001<br>(.165)                      | -.119<br>(.168)                     |
| <b>High School</b>    | -.277<br>(.225)                | -.166<br>(.203)                     | -.314<br>(.168)                     |
| <b>N</b>              | 369                            | 369                                 | 369                                 |
| <b>AIC</b>            | 448.438                        | 516.260                             | 508.728                             |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

*Table 3: Bivariate Logistic Regression on Education for Probability of White Native French Vote*

(Reference category: Higher education)

|                       | EU Elections              | 04 1 <sup>st</sup> Round Reg. | 04 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round Reg. |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>No Diploma</b>     | .027<br>(.025)            | -.039<br>(.026)               | .024<br>(.027)                |
| <b>Grammar School</b> | <b>-.205***</b><br>(.021) | <b>-.075***</b><br>(.022)     | <b>-.067**</b><br>(.023)      |
| <b>High School</b>    | .012<br>(.028)            | .032<br>(.029)                | .008<br>(.030)                |
| <b>N</b>              | 21,476                    | 21,476                        | 21,476                        |
| <b>AIC</b>            | 29,503.098                | 27,445.606                    | 26,292.685                    |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

Table 4: Bivariate Logistic Regression on Social Class for Probability of Caribbean Vote  
(Reference category: Professional)

|                                    | EU Elections    | 04 1 <sup>st</sup> Round Reg. | 04 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round Reg. |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Students</b>                    | -.362<br>(.349) | -.117<br>(.286)               | -.093<br>(.302)               |
| <b>Unemployed</b>                  | -.552<br>(.589) | .119<br>(.457)                | .382<br>(.472)                |
| <b>Agriculture</b>                 | NA              | NA                            | NA                            |
| <b>Manual Laborers</b>             | -.552<br>(.450) | -.236<br>(.354)               | .262<br>(.367)                |
| <b>Employees</b>                   | .161<br>(.327)  | -.381<br>(.288)               | .347<br>(.303)                |
| <b>Self-Employed/Artisans</b>      | -.621<br>(.957) | .694<br>(.759)                | -1.584<br>(.952)              |
| <b>White Collar Administrative</b> | .023<br>(.426)  | .208<br>(.373)                | .374<br>(.388)                |
| <b>N</b>                           | 230             | 230                           | 230                           |
| <b>AIC</b>                         | 263.427         | 328.484                       | 325.927                       |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

Table 5: Bivariate Logistic Regression on Social Class for Probability of Maghrebian Vote  
(Reference category: Professional)

|                   | EU Elections            | 04 1 <sup>st</sup> Round Reg. | 04 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round Reg. |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Students</b>   | <b>-.988*</b><br>(.357) | <b>-.886**</b><br>(.274)      | <b>-.665*</b><br>(.264)       |
| <b>Unemployed</b> | .327<br>(.307)          | .231<br>(.289)                | .567<br>(.303)                |

|                                    |                 |                 |                 |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <b>Agriculture</b>                 | NA              | NA              | NA              |
| <b>Manual Laborers</b>             | .319<br>(.251)  | .303<br>(.234)  | .259<br>(.238)  |
| <b>Employees</b>                   | .107<br>(.252)  | .236<br>(.228)  | .278<br>(.233)  |
| <b>Self-Employed/Artisans</b>      | -.331<br>(.696) | -.215<br>(.584) | -.829<br>(.614) |
| <b>White Collar Administrative</b> | .175<br>(.289)  | -.207<br>(.266) | .007<br>(.268)  |
| <b>N</b>                           | 369             | 369             | 369             |
| <b>AIC</b>                         | 450.773         | 508.246         | 506.278         |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

*Table 6: Bivariate Logistic Regression on Social Class for Probability of Native White French Vote*

*(Reference category: Professional)*

|                                    | <b>EU Elections</b>       | <b>04 1<sup>st</sup> Round Reg.</b> | <b>04 2<sup>nd</sup> Round Reg.</b> |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>Students</b>                    | <b>-.695***</b><br>(.072) | <b>-.685***</b><br>(.066)           | <b>-.774***</b><br>(.066)           |
| <b>Unemployed</b>                  | .067<br>(.041)            | <b>-.093*</b><br>(.042)             | <b>-.159***</b><br>(.042)           |
| <b>Agriculture</b>                 | <b>.251***</b><br>(.058)  | <b>.164**</b><br>(.062)             | <b>.301***</b><br>(.067)            |
| <b>Manual Laborers</b>             | <b>-.179***</b><br>(.031) | <b>-.088**</b><br>(.032)            | <b>-.103**</b><br>(.033)            |
| <b>Employees</b>                   | -.028<br>(.029)           | <b>.081**</b><br>(.031)             | <b>.063*</b><br>(.032)              |
| <b>Self-Employed/Artisans</b>      | -.048<br>(.051)           | .029<br>(.053)                      | .091<br>(.056)                      |
| <b>White Collar Administrative</b> | <b>.212***</b><br>(.033)  | <b>.263***</b><br>(.035)            | <b>.222***</b><br>(.036)            |
| <b>N</b>                           | 21476                     | 21476                               | 21476                               |
| <b>AIC</b>                         | 29302.066                 | 27270.078                           | 26073.064                           |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

Table 7: Multivariate Logistic Regression for Probability of Vote

|                              | Native White French       |                            |                           | Caribbeans              |                           |                          | Maghrebians              |                         |                         |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                              | EU                        | Reg. R1                    | Reg. R2                   | EU                      | Reg. R1                   | Reg. R2                  | EU                       | Reg. R1                 | Reg. R2                 |
| <b>Education</b>             | <b>.293***</b><br>(.016)  | <b>.199***</b><br>(.017)   | <b>.192***</b><br>(.017)  | <b>.422*</b><br>(.191)  | <b>.496**</b><br>(.181)   | <b>.527**</b><br>(.181)  | -.049<br>(.143)          | -.027<br>(.120)         | -.029<br>(.122)         |
| <b>Employed</b>              | <b>-.071*</b><br>(.034)   | <b>-.024***</b><br>(.0304) | <b>-.218***</b><br>(.035) | .402<br>(.352)          | <b>.830*</b><br>(.334)    | .429<br>(.322)           | -.377<br>(.254)          | -.309<br>(.227)         | -.389<br>(.231)         |
| <b>Gender</b>                | <b>-.062*</b><br>(.029)   | -.003<br>(.029)            | .013<br>(.031)            | <b>-.732*</b><br>(.341) | <b>-1.36***</b><br>(.327) | <b>-.773*</b><br>(.314)  | -.027<br>(.245)          | .369<br>(.221)          | .339<br>(.222)          |
| <b>Age</b>                   | <b>.409***</b><br>(.018)  | <b>.261***</b><br>(.019)   | <b>.297***</b><br>(.019)  | <b>.557**</b><br>(.191) | <b>.685***</b><br>(.192)  | <b>.745***</b><br>(.198) | <b>.521***</b><br>(.147) | <b>.385**</b><br>(.137) | <b>.404**</b><br>(.137) |
| <b>Married</b>               | <b>-.312***</b><br>(.032) | <b>-.488***</b><br>(.032)  | <b>-.565***</b><br>(.033) | -.198<br>(.384)         | .392<br>(.362)            | .093<br>(.349)           | -.195<br>(.251)          | -.236<br>(.229)         | -.028<br>(.231)         |
| <b>5 years Residence</b>     | <b>-.288***</b><br>(.037) | <b>-.207***</b><br>(.038)  | <b>-.309***</b><br>(.038) | .232<br>(.369)          | .139<br>(.354)            | .085<br>(.346)           | -.083<br>(.283)          | .030<br>(-.256)         | .363<br>(.259)          |
| <b>Residence since birth</b> | .056<br>(.040)            | <b>.091*</b><br>(.041)     | <b>.105*</b><br>(.043)    | .118<br>(.711)          | -.525<br>(.567)           | -.813<br>(.554)          | -.006<br>(.349)          | -.314<br>(.298)         | -.166<br>(.298)         |
| <b>Urban</b>                 | <b>-.022***</b><br>(.005) | <b>-.033***</b><br>(.005)  | <b>-.034***</b><br>(.005) | .056<br>(.063)          | -.054<br>(.057)           | -.079<br>(.057)          | -.033<br>(.053)          | <b>-.107*</b><br>(.051) | -.093<br>(.051)         |
| <b>ZUS</b>                   | -.142<br>(.081)           | -.107<br>(.079)            | <b>-.170*</b><br>(.081)   | -.554<br>(.492)         | <b>-1.19*</b><br>(.443)   | -.369<br>(.409)          | -.056<br>(.319)          | .305<br>(.278)          | .438<br>(.283)          |
| <b>Far Right EU</b>          | <b>-.169***</b><br>(.029) |                            |                           | -.575<br>(.388)         |                           |                          | -.492<br>(.291)          |                         |                         |
| <b>Far Left EU</b>           | <b>.061*</b><br>(.031)    |                            |                           | .045<br>(.409)          |                           |                          | -.227<br>(.278)          |                         |                         |
| <b>Far Right Region. R1</b>  |                           | <b>-.075***</b><br>(.016)  |                           |                         | -.132<br>(.161)           |                          |                          | .063<br>(.122)          |                         |
| <b>Far Left Region. R1</b>   |                           | <b>.044*</b><br>(.019)     |                           |                         | <b>-.669**</b><br>(.234)  |                          |                          | -.185<br>(.145)         |                         |

|                             |           |           |                           |         |         |                          |         |         |                |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------------------------|---------|---------|----------------|
| <b>Far Right Region. R2</b> |           |           | <b>-.078***</b><br>(.018) |         |         | <b>-.385*</b><br>(.179)  |         |         | .124<br>(.115) |
| <b>Left Wing Region. R2</b> |           |           | .011<br>(.015)            |         |         | <b>-.411**</b><br>(.129) |         |         | .078<br>(.096) |
| <b>N</b>                    | 21476     | 21476     | 21476                     | 230     | 230     | 230                      | 369     | 369     | 369            |
| <b>AIC</b>                  | 28564.376 | 28569.194 | 26724.675                 | 260.012 | 261.780 | 296.390                  | 440.739 | 441.490 | 513.382        |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

Table 8: Multivariate Logistic Regression for Probability of Vote

|                              | Spanish                  |                          |                          | Italian                  |                         |                         | Polish                  |                        |                 | Portuguese             |                        |                        |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
|                              | EU                       | Reg. R1                  | Reg. R2                  | EU                       | Reg. R1                 | Reg. R2                 | EU                      | Reg. R1                | Reg. R2         | EU                     | Reg. R1                | Reg. R2                |
| <b>Education</b>             | .214<br>(.147)           | -.076<br>(.152)          | .103<br>(.159)           | <b>.375**</b><br>(.123)  | .077<br>(.123)          | .339<br>(.132)          | .154<br>(.235)          | -.138<br>(.227)        | -.166<br>(.233) | .318<br>(.225)         | .107<br>(.212)         | .271<br>(.221)         |
| <b>Employed</b>              | -.399<br>(.298)          | <b>-.962**</b><br>(.297) | <b>-.923**</b><br>(.304) | -.073<br>(.259)          | .020<br>(.256)          | -.192<br>(.263)         | -.272<br>(.568)         | -.170<br>(.497)        | -.903<br>(.539) | .031<br>(.421)         | -.155<br>(.387)        | .043<br>(.393)         |
| <b>Gender</b>                | -.115<br>(.253)          | -.347<br>(.268)          | .209<br>(.274)           | .042<br>(.208)           | -.213<br>(.211)         | -.274<br>(.218)         | -.585<br>(.408)         | -.495<br>(.399)        | -.306<br>(.402) | .204<br>(.369)         | -.268<br>(.352)        | -.285<br>(.361)        |
| <b>Age</b>                   | <b>.659***</b><br>(.156) | <b>.361*</b><br>(.154)   | .447<br>(.158)           | <b>.454***</b><br>(.136) | .149<br>(.134)          | <b>.368**</b><br>(.139) | .527<br>(.311)          | .067<br>(.285)         | .448<br>(.304)  | .482<br>(.298)         | .386<br>(.280)         | .134<br>(.284)         |
| <b>Married</b>               | -.384<br>(.276)          | -.301<br>(.280)          | <b>-.612*</b><br>(.283)  | -.175<br>(.215)          | -.343<br>(.214)         | <b>-.486*</b><br>(.220) | <b>-.958*</b><br>(.445) | -.266<br>(.400)        | -.596<br>(.401) | .048<br>(.443)         | -.364<br>(.414)        | <b>-1.18</b><br>(.431) |
| <b>5 years Residence</b>     | -.369<br>(.318)          | -.178<br>(.322)          | -.363<br>(.325)          | <b>-.639*</b><br>(.256)  | <b>-.488*</b><br>(.238) | -.479<br>(.249)         | -.111<br>(.622)         | -.593<br>(.522)        | -.815<br>(.535) | -.279<br>(.406)        | -.025<br>(.379)        | -.611<br>(.385)        |
| <b>Residence since birth</b> | -.294<br>(.390)          | .448<br>(.399)           | -.499<br>(.446)          | -.267<br>(.319)          | -.433<br>(.339)         | -.602<br>(.358)         | -.062<br>(.583)         | .575<br>(.535)         | .420<br>(.546)  | <b>2.56*</b><br>(.108) | <b>1.28*</b><br>(.587) | 1.05<br>(.571)         |
| <b>Urban</b>                 | -.024<br>(.041)          | -.035<br>(.043)          | -.005<br>(.044)          | .007<br>(.034)           | -.001<br>(.035)         | -.024<br>(.036)         | .110<br>(.068)          | .082<br>(.064)         | .094<br>(.065)  | -.094<br>(.063)        | .078<br>(.059)         | .009<br>(.060)         |
| <b>ZUS</b>                   | .358<br>(.648)           | .750<br>(.690)           | 1.19<br>(.840)           | .390<br>(.468)           | -.829<br>(.466)         | -.500<br>(.477)         | -.107<br>(1.19)         | .277<br>(.926)         | -.149<br>(.938) | .986<br>(.704)         | .033<br>(.717)         | .644<br>(.809)         |
| <b>Far Right EU</b>          | .129<br>(.282)           |                          |                          | -.232<br>(.208)          |                         |                         | .189<br>(.518)          |                        |                 | .361<br>(.371)         |                        |                        |
| <b>Far Left EU</b>           | .229<br>(.285)           |                          |                          | -.053<br>(.226)          |                         |                         | -.736<br>(.406)         |                        |                 | .459<br>(.406)         |                        |                        |
| <b>Far Right Region. R1</b>  |                          | .033<br>(.130)           |                          |                          | .047<br>(.113)          |                         |                         | <b>-.640</b><br>(.309) |                 |                        | .210<br>(.182)         |                        |
| <b>Far Left Region. R1</b>   |                          | .166<br>(.151)           |                          |                          | -.036<br>(.128)         |                         |                         | -.163<br>(.281)        |                 |                        | .182<br>(.223)         |                        |

|                             |         |         |                |         |         |                 |         |         |                 |         |         |                 |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|----------------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|---------|-----------------|
| <b>Far Right Region. R2</b> |         |         | .195<br>(.149) |         |         | .216<br>(.120)  |         |         | -.444<br>(.281) |         |         | -.031<br>(.225) |
| <b>Left Wing Region. R2</b> |         |         | .141<br>(.129) |         |         | -.046<br>(.098) |         |         | -.285<br>(.209) |         |         | .041<br>(.191)  |
| <b>N</b>                    | 313     | 313     | 313            | 459     | 459     | 459             | 149     | 149     | 149             | 157     | 157     | 157             |
| <b>AIC</b>                  | 424.268 | 424.416 | 396.029        | 622.362 | 617.423 | 609.598         | 194.891 | 199.835 | 208.477         | 204.850 | 203.739 | 221.6           |

Note: \*= $p < .05$ , \*\*= $p < .01$ , \*\*\*= $p < .001$

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