

**The Rise of a New Political Class?
The populist challenge and party transformation
in Western Europe.**

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Summary

During the last decade of the 20th century many new parties have emerged in European party systems. Often these parties have been labelled as populist, extreme-right or anti-system parties. This paper examines to what extent new parties adopt a populist issue profile and which impact these new parties have on the party system as a whole. Our paper delves into the relationship between the rise of new populist parties and the demise of the established parties in many European party systems. Why have new parties often successfully emerged in multi-party systems - often in formerly consociational democracies - and why have populist parties mainly emerged on the 'right'-as opposed to the 'left' - of the political spectrum? In addition we discuss their participation in party government. Our findings suggests that most populist parties can be considered as Rightwing Radical with an issue profile of their own that is often translated in electoral growth and a growing access to government since the 1990s that cannot and should not be underestimated nor ignored by the political class representing the established parties.

1. Introduction

One cannot fail to observe the successful rise of 'new' political parties during the nineties and conversely the relative *demise* of *established* parties. What causes these changing patterns of electoral allegiance and party competition? Although after the Fall of the Berlin Wall liberal democracy seemed to have no genuine rival political ideology any more (Fukuyama 1992), mass publics in the West nevertheless appear to become increasingly more discontent with the political institutions of liberal democracies and the concomitant political elites (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Coupled with the de-alignment of traditional political loyalties and affiliations (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), liberal democracy in its current institutional format is not as uncontested as is often assumed.

Our guiding *research question* is whether the often successful emergence of new parties is not merely coincidental but – as these mainly emerge in the typical consensus democratic polities – rather are a significant development within European democracies where 'old' forms of contestation (and elite cooperation in governance) within the political class is gradually replaced by 'new' challengers that often emerge on the (radical) right-wing of the political spectrum thereby jeopardising the status quo.

In order to make sense of this, we examine four dimensions of party system change in relation to the rise of a new political class. First, on the *vertical* dimension – the relation between the political class and the demos - we (1) relate the rise of populism to changes in mass perception and evaluation of

the political system as a whole, focussing on levels of system support and political cynicism among the electorate. We argue that a new political class of political entrepreneurs mobilises existing and latent discontent of new groups of 'outsiders' and disappointed voters in general. Here, populism is operationalised as an appeal to 'the people' on the basis of anti-establishment critique against political intermediaries (the established political parties) and a call for a more direct link between political leaders and citizens. We shall not only incorporate 'new' parties per se but also new 'populist' parties that have emerged from a former traditional party (either as a result of a split or 'refoundation'; see also Mair, 1999). Secondly, we (2) assess how the rise of populist challengers affect the fundamental issue ownership of the traditional competitors in European party systems and consequently their competitive strength (Budge and Farlie, 1983).

Third, on the *horizontal* axis – inter-party competition - we assess (3) how these 'new' types of ideological competition by populist parties are affecting the usual patterns of competition at the party system level both among the traditional parties as well as between traditional and new parties. Finally, we will examine (4) how these new parties transform traditional patterns of coalition formation and the strategies of the traditional parties adopt to deal with the challenge from these new competitors. We will analyse *all* 'new' parties that have successfully emerged between 1990 and 2003 in order to assess whether or not the emergence of new political parties is linked to governmental and systemic instability due to new forms – inter alia populism. These four dimensions have been summarised in Appendix 1.

2. Emergence and Success of New Parties

Recently, more attention is paid to the concept and impact of 'new parties' in political science (see: Ignazi, 1997; Hug, 2001; Mair, 2002). Most conceptualisations are theoretically confusing and empirically misleading. Confusing is that often the underlying idea of researchers is that new parties tend to be (extreme) right-wing or post-materialist in terms of their ideology or at least 'green' or progressive (see: Ignazi, 1997; Müller-Rommel 1993; Lane and Ersson, 2002). In addition, these studies seem to suggest that parties are "new" simply because they are not old. What distinguishes new parties from old parties and what type of party is emerging? Simon Hug rightly points out that 'new' parties (have been) develop(ing) all the time in all forms and formats but that we simply do not remember most of them any more (Hug, 2001: 14). One obvious reason to forget them is because they had very little impact on the party system as a whole. Another reason is that many 'new' parties are in fact the result of a fusion (e.g. CDA, Green Left and Christian

Union in the Netherlands), a change of name (e.g. the Senter Partiet in Sweden), a fission within the old party (e.g. the Liberales Forum in Austria) or of a development of two party systems in one polity (as can be seen in Belgium due to its transformation toward a federalised state).

In other words: the definition of what constitutes a 'new party' varies considerably among students of parties (see: Mair, 1990; Hug, 2001: Ch. 5; Deschouwer, 2004: 3-4). Mair, for instance, simply defines new parties as those that first began to contest elections after 1960 (including those parties emerging from a merger or split), which leads to the conclusion that more than 176 new parties emerged across Europe (Mair, 2002: Table 6.4). Conversely, Hug adopts a more restricted definition and includes only 'genuine' new parties that emerge without any help of members of existing parties and fissions. Fusions of two or more existing parties and electoral alliances are not considered new since this type concerns merely a reorganisation of established political parties (Hug, 2001: 13). This definition leads to the conclusion that most new parties are not successful electorally and the majority of them did not survive. In addition, this conceptualisation tends to exclude those organisations that are perhaps not 'genuinely new' but have transformed themselves radically and cannot be considered as to belong to their original party families. Obvious examples of this are the SVP in Switzerland, the National Alliance in Italy and the FPÖ in Austria (Luther, 2001). Should these parties, where a new leadership often has taken over and fundamentally have transformed the party during the nineties, also be considered new parties? Our solution is pragmatic: if and when such a party has clearly moved out of the bounds of its original party family then it is considered to be a 'new party' as well. Crucial is that these parties represent other issues than are principally 'owned' by the original party – they are more or less competing these. We argue that, despite their origin from established political parties they represent a genuinely new party.

Thus, in view of these considerations we propose to *define* a 'new party' as those *organisations that autonomously select candidates for public office, based on ideas that do not correspond with existing-cum-established party families during two subsequent elections* (see for an overview of these indicators: Von Beyme, 1985; Siaroff, 2000; Gallagher et al., 2001: 229ff; Keman and Pennings, 2004). In addition we propose – assuming that the 1990s are structurally different from the earlier times – that in empirical terms a new party ought to have participated in two successive elections after 1975 and gaining parliamentary representation. This period is chosen because we argue that since the mid-seventies the de-freezing of party systems (i.e. the Lipset/Rokkan hypothesis; see: Mair and Mudde, 1998) began to take shape. Below in table 1 we have listed the new parties that have emerged since 1975 in Europe and we also

indicate whether or not they belong to respectively the “New Right” or the “New Left” (later on we elaborate more fully how this distinction is made).

(Table 1. about here)

In all of the 13 countries included in this analysis, new political parties have emerged. The most susceptible party systems to renewal are found in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, followed by France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Ireland and Finland. Party systems in most Scandinavian countries and in the United Kingdom seem more resilient and less prone to the emergence of new political competitors. The table shows that particularly the consensus democracies of mainland Europe indeed encourage the formation of new parties (see for this categorization: Lijphart, 1999).

Two party families dominate this cluster of new political parties: the environmental or ‘green’ party family and the radical right. With the exception of Norway and the UK, green parties have entered all European party systems during the eighties and nineties. In most countries these are newly formed parties, only in Denmark and the Netherlands has the green movement merged into a broader left-wing alliance. The new parties of the radical right are far too heterogeneous to deserve the label ‘family’ suggests. They should rather be seen as an *extended* family with refounded and radically transformed liberal or conservative parties (FPO and SVP), revamped fascist parties (AN), regionalist parties (Lega Nord, Vlaams Blok/Belang) and ‘genuinely’ new parties (Progress Party, LPF, New Democrats).

In terms of electoral support for these new parties, the figures show that mainly in Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland new parties have accrued substantial electoral support. In Italy, three quarters of the electorate now cast their vote for new parties. Clearly, the Italian electorate has become by and large disconnected from their traditional political allegiances and now give parliamentary majorities to new political parties, in particular Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord (Hopkin, 2004). In three other consensus democracies (Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands) between one-third and a quarter of the electorate now supports new political parties. Growth in new party support, however, seems to be a continental affair as most European party systems show increasing numbers of voters supporting new parties, the exceptions being the UK and Ireland. The most salient finding, presented in the two bottom rows of the table, show that the support for Green parties rose from 2.8 percent in the 1990s on average to 4.9 percent in the following decade, while the radical right vote increased from 4.3 to 10 percent over the same period. Overall, new parties now attract more than twenty percent of the votes in Europe, half of which is mobilized by the new parties of the radical right. Before we turn to

the effects of this rise of new parties on European party systems, we first delve into the reasons why voters support new (radical right) parties.

3. Explaining the rise of new political parties

3.1 System disassociation of citizens

The development of many of the new parties as identified in the table above demonstrates, *inter alia*, the increasing signs of a new "anti-politics" culture emerging within the established western democracies. In a post Cold War era, in which democracy itself becomes almost taken for granted, and in an increasingly internationalised environment in which decision-making is developed by means of a technocratic or administrative rationale rather than on the basis of some partisan or ideological motivation, politics itself risks becoming devalued, as do its protagonists, the so-called "political class" whose members are coming from the (larger) established party families. As yet, this mood appears only rarely to generate a specific hostility to politics and to the political class. However, as we have shown it does lead to the successful emergence of new political competitors and 'challenger parties' in all European party systems, but particularly in consensus democracies.

Political leaders, especially those of traditional political organisations, find it increasingly difficult to appeal to overarching identities and loyalties of specific social groups. Traditional supporter groups are becoming less loyal, more diffuse and they have relatively few institutional links with (party-) political organisations, while new voter groups (younger generations and immigrants) enter the electorate with even less party-political socialisation and encapsulation (Kitschelt, 1997). Moreover, the traditional channels of communication, party organisations, ancillary organisations and the party press, have almost completely disappeared or have become privatised and commercialised in all European countries. The more successful emergence of new (radical right) parties in consensus democracies may be due to the fact that the decay of party-related civil society has been more pronounced in these countries. While on the one side this means that 'voters have now finally began to choose', on the other side it makes collective mobilisation for a coherent and long-term political project more problematic. What seem to be emerging are a more generalised growth of distrust in, and indifference to, traditional politics, political organisations and traditional leadership (see for example Hayward 1996; Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000). For the first time since the early years of post-war reconstruction, democratic procedures have themselves become a key issue in the national political agendas of the established democracies. This development is seen most obviously in the current debates and referenda on institutional reform of the EU, and also in

individual countries such as Belgium on the federalization of the national state, in Finland with respect to the direct election of the Head of State, in France and Italy on electoral reform and the political manipulation of the judiciary, in the Netherlands regarding directly elected public officials and the introduction of a referendum, and the United Kingdom on devolution of Wales and Scotland, the codification of the 'Rule of Law' and modification of the House of Lords. Despite the fact that the traditional parties have transformed their party organisation substantially and have shown a high capability to adapt to changing environments (Krouwel 1999; Krouwel 2005), the established parties nevertheless are less capable than hitherto in maintaining strong links with voters.

3.2 Declining electoral turnout

One indicator of this failure of the traditional parties and the electoral success of new parties across the "new" Europe since the 1990s are the steep rise in electoral volatility and the decline in turnout, particularly in the 1990s (Mair, 2002).

(Table 2 Electoral Features of European Democracies about here)

While turnout at national elections remained relatively high and stable until the 1980s (Andeweg 1996; Mair 2002), in recent decades a steady decline in voter participation is discernable (minus 8.15 % for all countries since the sixties). From table 2 we read that the decline in political participation in all European democracies between 1980 and present continues to drop (-3.35 %). Particularly citizens in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Finland are increasingly opting out of the political process. Sharp declines can also be seen in Austria, Germany, and to a lesser extent in Italy and France. Even in countries where turnout has been historically low, such as Switzerland and the UK, electoral participation is also declining. Only in Belgium (as a result of compulsory voting), Denmark and Sweden the drop in turnout is less steep. Yet, the overall trend is clearly down in all European countries, particularly in the last decade when the overall level of electoral participation plummeted with some eight percent. This dramatic decline in the 1990s resulted in the lowest level of electoral participation in the post-war period (see also Mair, 2002: 129.) Around a quarter of the European electorate now choose to stay at home on Election Day.

3.3 Increasing electoral volatility

Table 2 also provides the evidence for the increase in electoral volatility. While an increasing number of citizens choose not to show their face in a

polling station, those that do show up seem to have a growing propensity to switch parties from election to election. Bartolini and Mair (1990) concluded that until the 1990s a relatively low and stable level of electoral volatility could be observed across European party systems and traditional parties remained to dominate within their polity (see also Mair, 1997 and Mair, 2002). Particularly in the period spanning from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, party systems in Western Europe demonstrated extraordinary electoral stabilisation. Bartolini and Mair (1990, 100) calculated that, in the Lipset en Rokkan 'freeze-period' from 1918 until 1940, the total volatility was 9,9 percent per election on average, while the electoral volatility decreased in the period of 1945 until 1985 to an average of 8,7 percent per election. If the last period is broken down into two periods (1945-1965 and 1966-1985) the total volatility declined even more; from 9,0 percent in the first to 8,5 percent in the latter period. Under the assumption that volatility is not cumulative, Bartolini and Mair thus concluded from this that there is 91 percent electoral stability in Western Europe. Their overall conclusion is that there was growing stability in the larger European countries and growing instability in the smaller democracies of Europe, a point also observed by Pedersen (1983). In the last decade of the twentieth century, however, the speed of electoral volatility seems to have accelerated and widened to the larger democracies as well. Electoral volatility has increased in most European countries, particularly in Norway, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden. Mair (2002, 132-133) notes that the data on electoral participation and volatility indicate a radical shift from earlier patterns. Both the historically low levels of electoral turnout and the unprecedented high levels of electoral volatility indicate that fewer voters seem to regard national elections important enough to participate and those who do turn out to vote seem to switch more often between parties from one election to the next. We conclude therefore that voters turn out gradually and steadily and are becoming less loyal to traditional parties. Given the increase in vote shares for new parties together with less attendance at the voting box this obviously implies less satisfaction with the established parties as well as a declining attachment to the political system as a whole.

3.4 Electoral support for new political parties

With the demise of the link between citizens and the traditional political organisations, voters are shifting their political preferences increasingly to new parties. As can be seen from the last to columns of table 2, more than twenty percent of European electorates now vote for new political parties. Here we can also observe an upward trend that accelerates in the last decade, with a peak in the 1990s (Mair, 2002: 134-135). Particularly the Christian democratic and the social democratic parties have been haemorrhaging popular support since the 1970s. Christian democratic parties have lost a

considerable share of their popular support since the 1950s when they polled around thirty per cent of the vote across Europe. Since the 1960s this level declined and Christian democratic electoral support in Western Europe is now around the twenty per cent level. Parties of social-democratic origin also lost electoral support, from a steadfast average of over thirty percent between the 1950s and the 1970s to around twenty-seven percent in the 1980s and 1990s (Krouwel 1999; Pennings 2002). Voters are clearly moving away from the traditional party alternatives at an increasing pace and if they do not leave the electorate they prefer to support new political competitors. Why are voters moving away from the traditional party families and why are the radical right parties so successful in attracting these voters that are adrift?

4. Programmatic polarization and convergence among established parties.

One answer to these questions is that new parties are attracting more voters because the traditional parties are moving closer to one another in terms of policy and are thus converging towards the centre space of political competition. The questions that guides us here is: Do new radical right parties emerge when a political 'space' exist at the right wing of the political spectrum because the traditional parties converge? As a first test we have calculated the changes in the total range of the space of party competition, which is the distance between the most right-wing party and the most extreme left-wing party within a party system. We have calculated the extent of polarization on two dimensions of competition: the traditional Left-Right dimension and the Progressive-Conservative dimension of competition (for calculation see table 3 below).

(Table 3 about here)

The level of polarization of the Left-Right dimension is cross-nationally diminishing whereas the contestation over Progressive versus Conservative stances is growing since the eighties (9.7). At the level of the individual party systems, we see that in six countries the traditional parties are moving closer to one another in terms of Left versus Right: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden. In six other countries parties have actually polarized their position on the Left-Right range of party competition: in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Great Britain. On the Progressive-Conservative dimension many party systems show indeed a tendency towards polarization. Eight countries polarise on the Progressive-Conservative dimension: Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Great Britain. In Germany and Ireland there is very little programmatic change on this dimension, while only parties in Belgium and Switzerland seem to come closer together on this conflict dimension. To

make more sense of this pattern of polarisation, table 4 organises the countries in a two-by-two table.

Table 4 Two-dimensional polarisation in European party systems

		Left-Right		
		+	-	
Progressive-Conservative	+	Austria (32.1) Norway (12.3) The Netherlands (26.1) Italy (73.4) Great Britain (0.0)	Denmark (13.6) France (22.8) Sweden (8.2)	23.6
	-	Switzerland (25.9)	Belgium (30.8) Finland (19.4) Germany (11.2) Ireland (13.3)	20.1
		28.3	18.2	

In brackets are the percentages of votes for new parties

Contrary to what is commonly assumed, this cross-tabulation suggests that polarisation, particularly polarisation on the Left-Right dimension, is not strongly associated the emergence of new parties. Indeed, countries with the highest level of support for new parties tend to cluster in the cell that indicates polarisation, not convergence on both dimensions (Austria, Italy and the Netherlands). The absence of new parties in Britain, also in that cell, may simply be the artefact of the majoritarian electoral system. That said, in seven countries where parties have converged on the Left-Right dimension, new parties have successfully entered the political arena. Although there is not a causal effect to be observed here, it is noteworthy that there appears to be two trajectories for new parties to emerge successfully: the opportunities appear to be enhanced where polarisation is decreasing, and conversely the same opportunity structure is facilitated where polarization grows. This may well be understood as a two-way model: where party systems show change it is associated with the growth of new parties. The two outliers in this respect – FN in France and SVP in Switzerland – can be considered as a result of idiosyncratic developments. In France most parties change regularly in name and ideological direction, which produces volatile patterns of polarization (Gallagher et al., 2001). Alternatively, within the party-cartel in Switzerland patterns are quite stable in this respect and all parties have been rather conservative, but in terms of socio-economic priorities vis-à-vis associated problems political contestation has been growing of late (Linder, 1994; Armingeon, 2000).

In order examine to more closely the ‘crowding of the centre-space’ in European party systems, table 3 provides data on the convergence of parties

towards the median of the political spectrum (the 0-point) on both dimensions of party competition. The results show that, again contrary to what is commonly assumed, that in most party systems parties are moving away from the centre on the Left-Right dimension. The overall trend is one of centrifugal movement and not of increasing centripetal competition in Left-Right terms. Only in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland and Ireland a centripetal movement of political parties can be observed. Clearly there is little evidence of a secular and linear development towards more contracted ranges of party competition across Europe in the last two decades. The more common centrifugal tendency was most extensive in Austria, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Great Britain and to a lesser extent in France, Germany and Sweden. On the Progressive-Conservative dimension there is more centripetal movement. Only in Austria, France, Norway and Britain we see a centrifugal movement of parties. Again we present a cross-tabulation to make sense of the pattern of convergence and divergence in both dimensions of party competition.

Table 5 Two-dimensional convergence in European party systems

		Left-Right		
		+	-	
Progressive-Conservative	+	Austria (32.1) France (22.8) Norway (12.3) Great Britain (0.0)		16.8
	-	Denmark (13.6) Germany (11.2) Italy (73.4) Sweden (8.2)	Belgium (30.8) Finland (19.4) Ireland (13.3) The Netherlands (26.1) Switzerland (25.9)	24.7
		21.7	23.1	

In brackets are the percentages of votes for new parties

Table 5 enhances the pattern that was visible in Table 4. The data suggests that both convergence and divergence appear to contribute to the emergence and success of new parties. Party systems where parties diverge at least on the Left-Right dimension also show substantial propensity to new party origin and support. Hence, contrary to what is often argued, our preliminary analysis show that new parties emerge under a varying development of party competition across Europe. From Tables 4 and 5 we infer that there are two roads that appear to bring about new parties: new parties mainly emerge where there is increasing party contestation on both dimensions of party competition, while new party support is also growing when all parties depolarise and converge towards the centre. This paradoxical finding may be explained by the fact that we are tapping into a process where new (radical

right) parties emerge when traditional parties show centripetal movement and in response to the success of these new parties, the traditional parties adopt more centrifugal patterns of competition. However, the question is then, why do new (radical right) parties maintain to have electoral success?

5. New parties, new issues?

5.1 New radical right populist parties

The emergence of new parties can therefore not simply be considered as a one-way causal argument on the basis of party systems' dynamics alone. On the contrary: in addition to this, so we argue, the capacity of new parties to successfully appeal to the electorate is particularly due to the development of a fundamentally different set of issues and issue priorities that lie *outside* the confines of the Left versus Right and Progressive versus Conservative dimensions. In order to test this assumption we first have to return to table 3. In the last four columns of the table we can see that new radical right parties have a very distinct and coherent position on the right-wing of the political spectrum in all countries on both dimensions of party competition. In all party systems, but particularly in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland and Finland the new radical right parties depart substantially from the party system mean (the relative centre of party competition).

Despite the fact that the new radical right parties position themselves far from the political centre of party competition, they should not be labelled by definition as 'extreme-right' political parties. We will argue that the new radical right must be labelled *populist right* if and when their profile in issue priorities is not only distinctive but also substantively different. Below we will show that the issue priorities of the new radical right parties consist of a coherent set of issues that all tap into the core of a populist ideological profile. Moreover, this coherent set of issue-priorities can also be clearly distinguished from the issue priority of the other dominant new party type, the ecological parties.

5.2 Populist ideology and issues

To proof our point, we must first specify what constitutes a populist issue profile. In the literature three core elements of a populist ideology are dominant: (a) the notion of a unified sovereign people whose will can be expressed by the actions of one political leader, (b) an aversion against political intermediaries such as political parties and (c) less institutional and bureaucratic procedures that stand in the way of the direct expression of the people's will (Canovan 1984; 2002; Taggart 2000; Meny and Surel 2002).

First and foremost populists demand that political decisions are made under full popular control, and that the sovereignty of the people is point of departure of all political action. Central to populism is the notion of a singular, united and organic people, which is pitted against those ruling in their name. Populists construct two cleavages: between the people and the establishment, and between 'the political elite' and the populist leader himself (Schedler 1996). Clearly the populist leader sides with the people on this divide. As Mudde (2004: 543) puts it: populism is 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'. In the eyes of the populist, the established elites have hijacked representative democracy, and the populist leader will bring it back to the people. As Mudde (2002) highlighted, elite and mass are moral categories that do not need to exist in reality. This leaves room for different connotations of the people, who can be defined ethnically, civically or as the common people ('the silent majority'). For populists differences between opposition and government are meaningless. Populists 'recode the universe of political actors as a homogeneous political class' (Schedler 1996: 295). For populists, the entire political establishment, whether in government or not, is recruited through the same corrupt institutional mechanism and they all take part in a corrupt system through the will of the people is betrayed. Thus, populists reject the political establishment, the ruling elite and 'politics as usual'. Populists perceive representative democracy as a malfunctioning system because the ruling class is corrupt, unrepresentative, unresponsive and incompetent. The leaders of the major traditional parties are not perceived as 'contenders', but as 'adversaries' (Schedler 1996: 300).

Next to the ruling elite, populists also agitate against intermediary political organisations (such as political parties) that stand in the way of the true, direct and uncorrupted expression of the will of the people. Populists argue, "that politics should be an expression of the *volonté général* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, 543). Populists criticise all political intermediary organisations such as political parties, trade unions and interest organisations, the bureaucracy, the press and the 'intelligentsia'. All these agents obstruct the free expression of the will of the people. That is precisely why populists attack representative democracy as it is organised and the elite that perverts it. Populism is, however, not an 'anti-system-ideology' in the sense of total rejection of the current order: populist parties do not propose a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the political-economic organisation of society, as the radical left once did. Populist disapproval of representative democracy is a reaction against elitist democracy and its institutional framework (Mair, 2005). In the populist's view, representatives do not represent the people but only themselves. Democracy as it functions is attacked in the name of democracy as an ideal. Populism is then, in the words of Kitschelt (2002: 179),

‘an expression of dissatisfaction with existing modes of organisation of elite-mass political intermediation’. The populist critique on representative democracy particularly focuses on political parties that are seen as divisive and the bureaucratic and institutional structures that they create in order to complicate and obscure policy-making. These intermediary structures and procedures need to be broken down in order to construct a more direct link between the will of the people and actions of the leader. Populists will propagate more direct forms of democracy, such as referenda, popular consultations and direct election of office-holders. By election of the populist leader (or in the pure populist mind, by his natural selection), the supremacy of the will of the people is restored.

5.3 Analysing populist tendencies among established and new parties

On the basis of these core elements of populism we have selected three issues that are derived from the Manifesto-Date Project, and which can be used proxy indicators of a populist stance of political parties. These are: *anti-bureaucracy* (denouncing political efficacy and lack of control), *anti-EU* (which refers to the idea of a ‘heartland’ and which serves as a proxy for anti-elite, anti-establishment), *pro-authority* (a proxy for strong leadership, more direct rule and anti-intermediary and anti-establishment stances) and *xenophobia* (an ethnic version of a unified and monolithic people, a ‘heartland’). We accept that these elements only indirectly tap into the more complex populist ideology, yet these indicators allow for a systematic and comparative examination of populist tendencies within new right wing parties. Moreover, this analysis allows for comparing the issue profiles different type of parties in this respect. Finally, it will demonstrate to what extent anti-bureaucratic, pro-authoritarian and xenophobic issue emphases are indeed coherent sets of preferences of new radical right-wing parties that make them indeed different from others. Table 6 provides the percentages of the manifestos of old, new and new radical right-wing parties devoted to these populist issues.

(Table 6 Populist Issue Emphasis about here)

As can be seen from the table, new parties and especially radical right wing parties clearly have a different issue profile compared to traditional parties. Radical right wing parties are far more anti-bureaucratic and anti-elite compared to traditional parties. Particularly when it comes to anti-EU issue emphasis: the new radical right opposes all the traditional parties that are by and large pro-European integration. Also radical right wing parties stress more frequently the need for more authoritative direct rule and they are far more xenophobic than the older parties. Obviously, traditional parties did not put too much emphasis on anti-bureaucratic and pro-authority issues until

the 1990s. In fact, during the 1980s new parties used to be not so different from the traditional parties, but the emergence of the radical right parties has dramatically transformed the political competition into a populist direction. At present, radical right wing parties do clearly differ from the other parties, exactly on these populist issues. In particular the running and functioning of domestic politics (see the substantial emphasis on anti-bureaucratic and pro-authority issues) are stressed and they have forced the other parties to compete on these issues of the organization of the state. Finally, among old and new parties, ecology as an issue has also become relevant and is emphasized more and more during the 1990s (8.1% for old parties and 10.3% for new parties). Again we see that radical right-wing parties are different from the other old and new parties that are more or less equal on this. To specify these finding more precisely, we have tabulated issue emphasis by country in table 7, in which we have run separate analysis for the new parties in each decade.

(Table 7 about here)

From this table it can be clearly seen that radical right parties compete on the populist issues of authority and bureaucracy. The level of emphasis on the working of the state-bureaucracy, and thus the functioning of the incumbent elite, is high above the national average in almost all countries. In particular the Belgium Vlaams Blok (now renamed Vlaams Belang), the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale in Italy and the Dutch LPF are staunch anti-bureaucratic parties. This difference between radical right wing parties and the other parties is even starker when we look at emphasis on the need for more political authority. Radical right wing parties place much more emphasis on strong leadership and authority than other parties in their party systems. Especially the FPÖ in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Italian radical right (LN and AN) and the Dutch LPF emphasize the need for more authoritative political action. Far less than is often suggested we see competition on the issue of the multicultural society (xenophobia). Emphasis on xenophobia, when it occurs, is nevertheless almost exclusively the domain of the radical right parties. These findings are important and not only highlight the fact that the radical right is more often than not populist and therefore different from other established and new parties, but it also makes us understand why party system change *per se* is insufficient for explaining the emergence and success of these parties. They compete in different terms and divergence or convergence of a party system is a collateral factor.

In order to further highlight the clear distinction between traditional and new parties, and within the new parties between the radical right and ecological parties, we analysed to what extent the various populist and the ecological

issue are related to one another in the manifestoes of European political parties. Table 8 provides the correlation-matrix of these issues.

(Table 8. Correlation matrix issue emphasis about here)

As can be seen from the table, anti-bureaucratic, pro-authority and xenophobic emphases are strongly interrelated. These interrelations become even stronger when we run the analysis only among the new parties and particularly amongst new radical right parties. From this table it also appears that emphasis on ecological issues clearly stands on its own as a Green issue. Although this issue is related to an anti-EU stance this makes these parties not radical right wing. Rather this Green party emphasis on anti-EU positions indicates a stance against a neo-liberal 'threat' from the process of European integration than an anti-bureaucratic and anti-elite position. This latter point bears out in the contemporary confusion in many left-socialist and green parties with respect to ratifying the EU-constitution.

From this analysis it is clear that new radical right wing parties emphasize much more strongly 'populist' issues, yet there are some erratic elements in the pattern of competition on populist issues. To make more sense of this we have regressed the Left versus Right-positions of parties with their emphasis on anti-bureaucratic and pro-authoritarian issues. It appears that these issues account for 40 percent (R^2) of a party being more to the right. In addition, we also observe that a party's emphasis on xenophobia is strongly interdependent with anti-EU emphasis. This may well imply that two bundles of issues emerging in European party systems that boost the competitive power of new parties: the viewing of the world 'outside' the own country and the dissatisfaction with the 'inside' performance of the democratic political system. And precisely these two bundles are difficult to contest for the established parties as well as for the more progressive new parties. 'Old' parties have an undeniable responsibility as parties of government in the eye of many of the voters, whereas the 'Green & Left' new parties are often considered as 'rebels' with an own agenda that does not concur with the population at large and certainly not with the cynical (non-) voter.

To summarise our argument: New parties appear to have successfully emerged due to the resignation of twenty percent of the voters to support traditional political parties (discounting the lower turn out of voters). Especially the radical right has been able to develop a niche of their own by means of stressing populist issues in particular. Conversely the established parties and the related 'political class' appear to be unable to counter this new mode and strategy of party competition. Yet, it can also be observed that the

traditional political elite seeks to defend its power basis by means of clinging to their office-seeking potential at the executive level. The extent to which this is indeed the case and the degree to which new parties have been able to enter the bastion of governmental power, is the subject of the next section.

6. Parties in Government: Strategies for survival?

Above we showed that new parties have been very successful in most European countries in electoral terms. They attract around one-fifth of the vote and have developed a policy-position and issue profile that is appealing to a large number of voters. In this section we will assess to what extent the rise of the new 'green' left and the radical populist right has impacted on government formation in Europe. First, in order to assess to which extent party systems have been susceptible to change in government (coalition) patterns, we look at the level of government 'alternation' and 'innovation' as Mair (2005) has suggested. The former is the extent to which the party composition changes more or less completely. The latter measure indicates the entrance of a new partner in a coalition (not to be confused with new parties per se!).

(Table 9 about here)

Table 9 shows that the actual rate of innovation is thirty per cent. This means that during the 1990s in 3 out of 10 governments new parties participated that had previously not been in government at all. In addition, in some countries major established 'governmental' parties were ousted for the very first time. In Belgium and the Netherlands this concerned the Christian Democracy (for the first time since World War II), while in Scandinavia the social democratic parties gradually lost their dominant position as the 'natural' party of government (and or were replaced or had to organize their office seeking powers thru minority government). In Italy both the Christian democrats and social democrats actually eclipsed, leaving the door to government wide open for a right-wing coalition of new parties (Lega Nord, Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale). This development can also be seen from the *rate of alternation*: apart from Switzerland – where the 'magic formula' (still) allows the 'cartel' to continue in government – most other countries show frequent changes in government composition. With the exception of Germany and Switzerland, all European democracies have often experienced alternation as well as quite some innovations, i.e. concomitant entrance of 'new' parties in government during the last decade of the 20th century. As the table shows, on average, new parties in Europe control 14.5 percent of ministerial portfolios.

When we take a closer look at government participation of the new parties under investigation in this paper, we see that 17 of the 44 new parties have actually entered government.

(Table 10 about here)

These 17 parties constitute some forty percent of all new parties. The largest group of new parties that entered a government are environmental parties. In Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Italy Green parties have obtained governmental status in the 1990s. As a result of the rise of populist radical rightwing parties during the 1990s (Meny and Surel, 2002; Capoccia, 2002), some of these have also entered party government: the LPF in the Netherlands, the FPÖ in Austria and Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord in Italy.

When we look at the percentage and type of ministerial portfolios new parties control, a distinct pattern emerges. Green parties, when in government, obtain on average nine percent of the available ministerial portfolios. Not surprisingly, Green parties primarily claim and attain ministries of the Environment, Energy, Sustainable Development and Mobility and Transportation. All these portfolios are clearly related to the disproportionate emphasis they put on environmental issues in their party manifestoes as we have seen earlier. Green parties also claim typical welfare related portfolios such as Social Affairs, Health and Equal Opportunity. What is surprising is that in some countries, the Greens adopt ministerial responsibilities in non-typical portfolios such as Finance and Foreign Affairs. This is contrary to what, for instance Budge and Keman (1990) originally argued regarding distributing the spoils of office.

Radical right populist parties show a different pattern of portfolio control. Their main concern seems to lie in the realm of national and international Law and Order, and indeed tend to claim ministerial portfolios such as Justice, National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior Affairs and Civil Protection. In addition, the populist right party in the Netherlands especially created a ministry of Foreigners and Integration. A second cluster of ministries that appeal to the populist right are concerned with economic control with ministries like Economic Affairs, Finance, Industry, Public Works, Transport and more elusive portfolios such as Innovation and Technology, Production Activities and Government Programme Achievement. However, even when radical right parties have to share executive office with Christian Democrats or liberals, as was the case in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands, they also claim portfolios in social sectors: Public Services, Social Security, Welfare, Health and Sport (the latter in fact in three countries!). Hence, it appears that these parties share across many portfolios once they enter government and is according to the "rules" of distribution as set out in Budge and Keman (1990; but see also Müller and Strøm, 1999). This means that portfolios are shared

out according to parliamentary strength or, conversely how dominant are other parties within a coalition (see also Table 9 with respect to Party Dominance in Government: The lower the ratio the less dominant the major party is). Although it may be seem a surprise that these parties also gain control over certain ministries regarding the “welfare State” this may well be understood as an extended way of re-organising society where not only ‘law & order’ is a concern, but also the abuse of social security, on the one hand, and the fear for ‘big government’, on the other hand. All in all we can observe that the emerging pattern of government participation by new parties is a wide spread phenomenon as well as that accruing portfolios appears as non-specific. Yet the prime conclusion must be that access is gained increasingly and often in policy areas that are considered as important for the overall policy performance.

Conclusion

What seems to be occurring in Europe is an increasing incongruence between electoral strength and governmental control. The traditional parties of government, the Christian and social democrats, liberals and conservatives are losing popular support, yet in some countries the old parties seem unwilling to share executive responsibility with new parties. Basically traditional parties seem to have followed two strategies. One of (hesitant) inclusion in order to make the new populist party an ‘accomplice’ of the political system, thereby preventing the populist of pursuing a strategy of the excluded outsider (pre-emptive incorporation). This type of incorporation of the radical and populist right occurs mainly where the new party is basically a ‘transformed’ traditional party, as in the case of the FPÖ in Austria and the SVP in Switzerland. Both the SVP and the FPÖ already had governmental experience before their populist re-birthing: the SVP being an integral part of the Swiss cartel government and the FPÖ had been the junior partner in two SPÖ-dominated coalitions in the 1980s. A second type of incorporation can be seen in Italy, where the post war party system collapsed in the 1990s and the traditional parties became discredited to such an extent that new parties now dominate the electoral and governmental arena. In fact, this is more a hostile take-over than incorporation as most of the Italian traditional parties have disappeared or are too weak to prevent the radical and populist right from governing. The inclusion of the LPF in the Netherlands is a deviant case. Here a totally new party (actually Fortuyn needed two political vehicles to enter the governmental arena) was immediately included in an otherwise ‘normal’ centre-right government of Christian democrats and liberals.

The alternative strategy is one of exclusion of the radical and populist right. This is mainly done by forming a ‘cordon sanitaire’ and/or a governmental

cartel, which often involves new types of cartelisation by including Green parties into coalitions. The most obvious example of this strategy is Belgium, where all the traditional and new parties have to closely work together to keep Vlaams Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) out of office. Traditional Belgian parties even seem prepared to change constitutional proviso's regarding regional governments composition to be reflected at the national level, as they fear that a takeover by Vlaams Belang of the regional government in Flanders could inevitably lead to national executive power. Also in France both parties from the centre-right and the left do not seem prepared to coalesce with the Front Nationale. Nevertheless, as the last French presidential elections have shown, the traditional parties need to cooperate and coordinate their electoral strategies, otherwise the radical populist right could sweep into executive office.

Whatever strategy is followed, there is no denying that the radical populist right is making inroads into the electoral basis of the traditional parties. The strategy of collusion and cartelisation of traditional parties may hold back the populist forces for some years, but the empirical evidence shows that the populist appeal will only increase as exclusion by the major political actors only feeds into their populist strategy. The fact that major parties in consensus democracies seem most inclined to respond with cartelisation in reaction to electoral rise of populist parties, may well explain the success of these new parties. Cartelisation of the traditional parties and blatant exclusion of parties with substantial electoral support only feeds the discontent and cynicism that seems to characterise modern electorates. In consensus democracies, where economic and social change such as de-industrialisation, individualisation and retrenchment of the welfare state have eroded many social and economic securities of citizens, the masses have begun to drift into a radical right and populist direction. Traditional elites need to find policies and strategies to restore the link between voters, parties and good governance. When the elites in consensus democracies and elsewhere only respond with further retreating into the bastions of the state, Italy will not have been the last total collapse of a political system. But even before such a situation occurs the 'political class' would be wise to reflect more on its own democratic performance during the nineties and how to re-establish its links with large parts of the electorate (the "demos"). Instead of defending only its power position vis-à-vis "new" parties, established parties need urgently to develop "new" ideas on how to govern *for* the people – which inevitably also implies in a representative democracy: Governing *by* the people!

Appendix 1. Four dimensions of party system transformation




Table 1. New Parties in European Party Systems 1980-2002

Country	Name of Party & Foundation Year	Party Family	Vote share 1980-1990	Vote Share 1990-2002	Change Votes NP	Type of party origination
Austria	United Greens [1982] & Green Alternative [1986] FPÖ [1987 - renamed: Freedom Movement - 1995] Liberal Forum [1995]	Green Radical Right Liberal	4.8 6.9 0.0	6.3 20.6 5.2	1.5 13.7 5.2	Birth [re]Birth Divorce
Total: 3			11.7	32.1	+20.4	
Belgium	Agalev [1977] Ecolo [1978] FN/National Front [1985] Vlaams Blok [1977] Rossem/Banaan [1991-1995]	Green Green Radical Right Radical Right Protest	4.8 2.5 0.0 7.5 0.0	5.3 5.4 4.2 13.9 2.0	0.5 2.9 4.2 6.4 2.0	Birth Birth Birth Birth Birth/dead
Total: 5			14.8	30.8	+16.0	
Denmark	Red-Greens [1989] Progress Party [now:] Danske Folke Party [1995]	Soc. & Green Radical Right	0.0 7.3	3.7 9.9	3.7 2.6	Marriage [re] Birth
Total: 2			7.3	13.6	+6.3	
Finland	Green League [1983] Leftwing Alliance [DeVa/VAS, 1987] [1990] True Finns [1995]	Green Socialist Protest[agrarian]	4.0 4.2 0.0	6.8 10.3 2.3	2.8 6.1 2.3	Birth Divorce [re] Birth
Total: 3			8.2	19.4	+11.2	
France	Union Democratic France [1987] Greens [1984] Ecology Generation [1990] Front National [1972, reformed in 1986]	Liberal/Cons. Green Green Radical Right	17.9 0.9 1.2 9.8	16.4 3.0 5.2 14.6	-1.5 3.1 4.0 4.8	Marriage Birth Divorce [re]Birth
Total: 4			29.8	39.2	+9.8	
Germany	Greens/Alliance [1980/1983] Party of Democratic Socialism [1990] Republikaner [1983]	Green Soc. Democratic Radical Right	6.2 0.0 0.0	6.6 3.9 0.7	0.4 3.9 0.7	Birth [re]Birth Divorce
Total: 3			6.2	11.2	+5.0	
Ireland	Democratic Left Party [1992] Green Party [1982] Progressive Democrats [1985]	Socialist Green Liberal	0.0 1.3 11.8	2.7 3.9 6.7	2.7 2.6 -5.1	Divorce Birth Birth
Total: 3			13.1	13.3	+0.3	

Italy	Green Federation [1987]	Green	0.0	2.7	2.7	Birth
	Democratic Party of the Left [former PCI] [1991]	Social Dem.	28.2	16.1	-12.1	[re] Birth
	Refounded Communists [1992]	Socialist	0.0	6.7	6.7	Divorce
	List Panella [PRI: 1976/1992]	Liberal	2.5	3.1	0.6	[re] Birth
	[MSI, now:] AN [1994]	Radical Right	6.0	11.7	5.7	Marriage
	Lega Nord [1991]	Radical Right	0.5	7.8	7.3	Birth
	Forza Italia [1993]	Conservative	0.0	25.2	25.2	Birth
Total: 7			34.7	73.4	+36.2	
Netherlands	Green-Left [1989]	Socialist & Green	2.9	5.6	2.7	Marriage
	Socialist Party [since 1989: electoral & parliamentary]	Socialist	0.4	4.3	3.9	Birth
	Allied Elderly [1993-1998]	Protest	0.0	2.5	2.5	Birth/dead
	Liveable Netherlands [2000]	Protest/Conservative	0.0	1.0	1.0	Birth/dead
	LPFortuyn [2002]	Radical Right	0.0	11.4	11.4	Divorce
	Centre Democrats [1984-1998]	Radical Right	0.6	1.2	0.6	Birth/dead
Total: 6			3.9	26.1	+22.1	
Norway Total: 1	Progress Party [1977]	Radical Right	4.1	12.3	+8.2	Birth
Sweden Total: 2	Environments/Greens [1981]	Left/Green	3.5	4.3	0.8	Birth
	New Democrats [only twice in parliament: 1991]	Radical Right	0.0	3.9	3.9	Birth/dead
			3.5	8.2	+4.7	
Switzerland Total: 4	Green Party [1983]	Green	5.0	5.4	0.4	Birth
	Auto Party/Freedom Party [1985/1994]	Protest	2.6	3.0	0.4	Birth
	Swiss Democrats [AN till 1991]	Radical Right	3.1	1.1	-1.0	[re] Birth
	SVP [1971: radicalised in the 90ies]	Radical Right	11.2	16.4	5.2	[re] Birth
			21.9	25.9	+4.0	
Gt. Britain Total: 1	Social Democratic Party [1983-1987]	Social Dem.	10.6	0.0	-10.6	Divorce & Dead
	Total Green Parties (average)		2.8	4.9	+ 2.1	
	Total Radical Right Parties (average)		4.3	10.0	+ 5.7	
	Total all new parties (average)		13.1	22.6	+ 9.5	

Birth = New Part; [re]Birth = fundamental change of party; Marriage = Fusion; Divorce = Fission; Dead = no more existing.

Table 2: Electoral Features of European Democracies

COUNTRY	TurnOut	ChangeTO1	ChangeTO2	ElVolatility	ChangeEv1	ChangeEv2	VotesNP	ChangeNP
Austria	83.60	-8.00	-9.80	9.40	3.90	6.10	32.10	20.40
Belgium*	91.60	-2.30	-.30	10.80	.80	.60	28.80	14.00
Denmark	84.50	-1.10	-2.80	13.00	3.30	4.30	13.60	6.30
Finland	69.90	-8.90	-15.10	11.00	2.30	4.00	19.40	11.20
France	69.10	-2.80	-7.50	16.90	3.50	5.40	22.80	11.90
Germany	79.40	-7.70	-7.70	8.00	1.70	.40	11.20	5.00
Ireland	67.10	.00	-7.10	10.70	2.60	3.70	11.60	-.20
Italy*	85.00	-4.00	-7.90	24.80	16.20	16.60	63.60	28.90
Netherlands*	77.50	-6.00	-17.50	23.60	15.30	15.70	24.90	21.50
Norway	78.10	-1.00	-4.70	15.40	4.70	10.10	12.30	8.20
Sweden	84.90	-4.20	-1.50	13.80	6.20	9.80	8.20	4.70
Switzerland	44.10	-.30	-20.10	10.00	3.60	6.50	25.90	4.00
UK	72.70	2.70	-3.90	9.30	6.00	4.10	10.60	-10.60
<i>EUrope</i>	<i>75.96</i>	<i>-3.35</i>	<i>-8.15</i>	<i>13.59</i>	<i>5.39</i>	<i>6.72</i>	<i>21.92</i>	<i>9.64</i>

N.B: all data in percentages. Row *EUrope* = Cross-national average [N = 13. Sources: Mair, 2002; Siaroff, 2000; Comparative Political Data Set, 2004; Inter-Parliamentary Union web site. * denotes Compulsary voting [till 1971 in NL and 1994 in Italy]. **TurnOut [TO]** = Electoral Participation. **Electoral Volatitlity [EV]**; **VotesNP** = vote share New Parties; **Level** = 2003; **Change** = Absolute differences, 1 = 1980-2003; 2 = 1960s-2003.

Table 3 Party System Convergence and Polarization 1980-2000

Country	Polarization		Convergence		All Parties (Party System Mean)		New Radical Right parties		All New Parties	
	LvsR	PvsC	LvsR	PvsC	LvsR	PvsC	LvsR	PvsC	LvsR	PvsC
Austria	+24.3	+14.8	+12.4	+9.8	-13.1	-3.7	-24.7	-11.8	-16.7	-2.4
Belgium	-16.6	-6.3	-7.1	-2.8	-8.5	0.4	-11.0	-0.7	-9.8	1.7
Denmark	-28.3	+20.6	+20.0	-3.3	-9.6	-1.5	-41.3	-18.8	-26.9	-3.8
Finland	0.0	-36.1	-7.8	-6.4	1.9	6.8	-11.3	-3.8	0.5	26.3
France	-2.4	+35.2	+9.3	+1.8	2.5	-1.6	-14.0	-10.7	-5.6	-0.6
Germany	-14.7	-1.9	+4.0	-4.6	-4.1	7.0	-	-	4.4	16.4
Ireland	-52.9	-0.1	-44.1	-2.4	0.5	3.3	-	-	10.8	14.5
Italy	+21.3	+56.8	+11.3	-0.6	-12.0	-1.8	-17.2	-7.6	-10.6	2.8
Netherlands	+7.6	+18.2	-1.6	-6.3	1.3	7.5	-22.9	-8.9	15.0	22.0
Norway	+20.6	+23.6	+13.4	+1.6	-2.8	0.8	-35.2	-21.3		
Sweden	-17.3	+19.1	+0.5	-0.7	-0.2	2.7	-	-	4.6	30.3
Switzerland	+16.2	-20.5	-16.7	-10.6	-5.6	2.3	-17.8	-13.0	-9.1	1.8
Gr. Britain	+11.8	+3.1	+10.3	+2.8	-5.8	0.7	-	-	-1.7	-6.5
EUrope	-2.34	9.73	0.3	-1.67	-4.27	1.76	-21.71	-10.73	-3.76	8.54

Source: Budge et al., 2001. N = 277. LvsR = Left versus Right. PvsC = Progressive versus Conservative (see below for measurement)

Polarization : +/- in/decrease of range in PS; **Convergence**: +/- closer/further from the Mean = 0.0 (note that the theoretical range of both scales is 200); **All Parties, All New Parties and New Radical Right parties**: average score on LvsR and PvsC for the period 1980-2000 on part system level.

Overview of four types of issues forming the two main conflict dimensions.			
Left issues	Right issues	Progressive issues	Conservative issues
Anti-imperialism	Military: positive	Anti-growth economy	Economical productivity
Peace	Individual Freedom	National Way of Life: negative	National Way of Life: positive
Internationalism: positive	Constitutionalism: positive		
Democracy	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	Multi-culturalism: positive	Multi-culturalism: negative
Market regulation	Free enterprise	Traditional morality: negative	Traditional morality: positive
Economic planning	Incentives to induce enterprise	Environmental protection	
Protectionism: positive	Protectionism: negative		
Controlled economy	Economic orthodoxy (thrift and saving; strong currency)		
Nationalisation	Welfare State Limitation		
Welfare state: expansion	Law and Order		
Education expansion	Social Harmony		
Labour groups: positive			

Source: Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge et al. 2001. This scale is published in Pennings & Keman, 2003.

The left-right scale is computed as: Left issues minus Right issues. The progressive-conservative scale is computed as: Progressive minus Conservative issues. The maximum value of the scale is 100 (all emphasis is on left or progressive issues). The minimum value is -100 (all emphasis is on right or conservative issues).

Table 6 Populist Issue Profile Comparing Old and New Parties in Europe 1980-2000

	Anti EU	Anti-Buro	Pro-Authority	Xenophobia	Ecology	N
1. Old parties 1980-1990	0.7	5.4	3.3	0.9	5.9	79
2. Old parties 1990-2000	0.7	7.4	8.9	1.0	8.1	61
3. New parties 1980-1990	0.3	7.8	4.3	0.8	12.0	10
4. New parties 1990-2000	1.4	7.3	9.2	2.2	10.3	32
5. Radical Right Parties 1990-2000	5.5	10.1	11.6	3.8	4.6	15

All entries in percentages of total manifesto.

Issues representing contestation among 'new' and 'old' parties as well as producing a 'populist' party profile. The issues are:

1. *Anti-EU* (Heartland ideas, anti-establishment) per 109 + 110
 2. *Anti-Bureaucracy* (anti-elite and soft state) per 301 + 202
 3. *Pro-Authority* (strong leadership and law & order) per 305 + 605
 4. *Xenophobia* (monolithic people and anti-foreigners) per 601 + 608
- And to serve Post-materialism
5. *Ecology* (environment) per 416 + 501

NB: all taken from Budge et al., 2001: Appendix and represent cumulative percentages of party programmes

Table 7 Issue Emphasis European Parties 1980-2000

Country	Anti-EU						Anti-Buro						Pro-Authority					
	All 8090	All 9000	New 8090	New 9000	Rrw 8090	Rrw 9000	All 8090	All 9000	New 8090	New 9000	Rrw 8090	Rrw 9000	All 8090	All 9000	New 8090	New 9000	Rrw 8090	Rrw 9000
Austria	0.0	1.8	-	2.5	-	0.3	9.7	8.5	-	5.9	-	8.4	5.8	15.6	-	17.0	-	18.3
Belgium	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.3	16.4	14.4	16.2	12.5	20.6	4.2	8.9	9.1	12.3	7.0	15.9
Denmark	1.2	1.2	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.2	1.8	3.9	1.7	5.3	1.7	6.5	1.6	11.7	1.7	8.8	1.7	9.6
Finland	0.2	1.3	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	6.4	1.2	0.0	0.9	-	1.9	2.3	8.8	0.0	9.8	-	15.1
France	0.3	1.5	0.0	1.5	0.0	2.7	5.7	3.9	10.9	4.2	10.9	4.1	1.5	4.5	0.0	4.6	0.0	8.5
Germany	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	-	-	5.1	7.8	4.9	3.0	-	-	4.2	5.6	7.3	4.4	-	-
Ireland	0.8	1.5	-	2.4	-	-	3.0	8.8	-	6.9	-	-	7.9	8.9	-	9.5	-	-
Italy	1.7	0.4	2.7	0.8	2.7	0.2	7.1	13.2	11.4	11.6	11.4	18.4	3.6	15.8	1.7	11.1	1.7	13.2
Netherlands	0.2	0.3	-	0.3	-	1.4	9.0	5.7	-	4.9	-	15.8	3.3	5.9	-	1.4	-	18.4
Norway	0.1	1.7	-	1.2	-	1.2	6.7	5.8	-	6.8	-	6.8	1.9	1.6	-	1.9	-	1.9
Sweden	0.0	2.2	-	9.7	-	-	3.8	3.9	-	0.0	-	-	1.8	3.4	-	0.0	-	-
Switzerland	1.1	0.7	0.0	1.5	-	1.9	2.5	5.5	0.0	7.0	-	9.4	3.2	9.8	2.9	10.4	-	9.4
Gr. Britain	0.9	1.9	0.3	-	-	-	6.3	7.3	6.7	-	-	-	2.9	16.1	2.2	-	-	-
Average	0.5	1.2	0.4	1.8	0.7	1.2	5.9	7.1	6.3	6.1	9.1	9.9	3.4	9.0	3.1	7.6	2.6	12.0

Country	Xenofobia						Ecology					
	All 8090	All 9000	New 8090	New 9000	Rrw 8090	Rrw 9000	All 8090	All 9000	New 8090	New 9000	Rrw 8090	Rrw 9000
Austria	0.2	1.3	-	1.6	-	2.3	7.6	3.8	-	5.4	-	4.2
Belgium	1.0	1.1	1.8	1.2	2.3	0.6	3.8	6.0	5.3	7.6	4.1	10.6
Denmark	0.2	0.5	0.0	1.1	0.0	2.2	3.7	6.5	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.3
Finland	0.4	1.5	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	13.2	10.2	39.6	11.9	-	0.0
France	1.9	2.9	0.0	5.1	0.0	8.7	1.6	8.6	5.5	12.5	5.5	5.6
Germany	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.1	-	-	11.6	8.1	17.1	10.0	-	-
Ireland	1.2	2.2	-	2.0	-	-	0.7	9.7	-	11.8	-	-
Italy	1.4	0.7	1.3	0.9	1.3	0.8	2.2	6.4	3.7	10.7	3.7	3.9
Netherlands	0.1	1.0	-	0.2	-	3.1	5.0	11.9	-	24.2	-	-
Norway	0.3	1.3	-	3.9	-	3.9	8.9	12.9	-	4.6	-	4.6
Sweden	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	-	-	8.8	11.4	-	30.6	-	-
Switzerland	2.7	3.1	0.0	5.7	-	7.7	14.7	5.8	36.8	7.4	-	5.8
Gr. Britain	0.6	1.8	0.6	-	-	-	2.0	4.5	1.3	-	-	-
Average	0.8	1.4	0.5	1.8	0.9	3.3	6.4	8.1	19.8	11.8	3.3	8.5

Table 8. Correlation matrix of issues of parties in Europe

	Anti-Bureaucracy		Pro-Authority		Anti-EU		Xenophobia		Ecology	
	All	RRW	All	RRW	All	RRW	All	RRW	All	RRW
Anti-Bureaucracy	-	-								
Pro-Authority	0.22**	0.03	-	-						
Anti-EU	-0.36**	-0.55**	-0.17*	-0.28**	-	-				
Xenophobia	-0.16	-0.48**	-0.50**	-0.27**	0.40*	0.63**	-	-		
Ecology	-0.25**	-0.16	-0.28**	0.0	0.16 *	0.19*-	0.07	0.57**	-	-

All parties N=277, RRW-parties N=33 [** = significant at 0.5; * = idem at 0.1]. Pearson Product Moment Coefficients

Table 9. Governmental features of European countries

Country	<i>GovDur</i>	<i>PartyDom</i>	<i>PSupport</i>	<i>MinContNP</i>	<i>Innovation</i>	<i>Alternation</i>
Austria	917.20	1.18	76.70	50.0	22.70	0.19
Belgium	510.90	1.29	63.20	11.1	22.00	0.55
Denmark	637.60	1.85	40.60	8.5	39.20	0.61
Finland	404.30	1.23	52.80	0.0	91.70	0.77
France	335.60	1.65	62.70	32.9	13.50	0.72
Germany	660.00	1.16	55.10	18.8	11.80	0.25
Ireland	900.10	1.45	50.90	11.6	62.60	0.62
Italy	330.80	1.35	53.50	23.1	41.50	0.69
Netherlands	879.10	1.15	61.80	18.0	37.10	0.67
Norway	774.50	1.35	47.10	0.0	24.30	0.50
Sweden	752.00	1.93	37.40	0.0	29.60	0.67
Switzerland	365.10	1.13	80.60	14.3	0.00	0.00
Gt Britain	995.40	1.60	54.50	0.0	0.00	0.30
Average	650.97	1.41	56.68	14.5	30.46	0.50

Sources: Sources: CPDS 2004; Mair, 2005; Siaroff, 2000; Comparative Political Data Set, 2002 [Armingeon]; Woldendorp et al. 2000; Inter-Parliamentary Union.

GovDur = Duration in days; PartyDom = Ratio of strength in parliament of party 1 & 2; MinContrNP = Ministerial control of new parties in percentages of total; Innovation = Entrance and duration of a new party in government; Alternation = Frequency & extent of government composition [0 = no change; high values is less change, low values much and encompassing change].

Table 10. New Parties in government (1980-2000)

Country Name Government	New party in Government	Year	Duration (WKB)	Reason for termination (WKB)	Number of Posts	Percentage of ministerial posts	Ministries
Austria Schüssel I	FPÖ	2000			6	50 %	Finance Justice National defence Public Services and Sports Social security and Generations Transport innovation & technology
Belgium Verhofstadt I	Agalev	1999			2	11.1 %	Consumer interests, health & environment Development Aid
	Ecolo				2	11.1 %	Vice-PM, Mobility and Transportation Energy / Sustainable development
Finland Lipponen I	Green League	1995			1	5.6 %	Environment
	Deva/VAS				2	11.1 %	Culture Social Affairs and Health II
Lipponen II	Green League	1999			1	5.6 %	Environment
	Deva/VAS				2	11.1 %	Finance Regional and Municipa Affairs
France Chirac	UDF	1986	784	1	13	43.2 %	Interior 2x Education Industry and Trade 2x Public Works 5x Other 3x
Rocard	UDF	1988	45	6	2	10.5 %	Interior Other
Balladur	UDF	1993	779	2	12	50.2 %	Defence Interior Economic Affairs 2x Education Housing Agriculture Industry and Trade Social Affairs Public Works 2x Other
Juppe I	UDF	1995	182	2	16	59 %	Defence Foreign Affairs Interior Justice Finance Economic Affairs 3x

							Labour Education Agriculture Industry and Trade Social Affairs Public Works 2x Other
Juppe II	UDF	1995	573	1	11	52.4 %	Foreign Affairs Defence Interior Finance Economic Affairs 2x Labour Education Agriculture Social Affairs Other
Jospin I	Greens	1997			2	10.0 %	Environment Other
Jospin II	Greens	2000			1	4.8 %	Environment
Germany Schröder I	Greens	1998			3	18.8%	Vice-chancellor, foreign affairs Environment Health
Ireland Haughey IV	PD	1989	944	2	3	20.0 %	Energy Public Works Industry and Commerce
Reynolds I	PD	1992	327	4	2	13.3 %	Public Works Industry and Trade
Bruton	DLP	1994	922	1	1	6.7 %	Social Welfare
Ahern	PD	1997			1	6.7 %	Enterprise and Employment
Italy Berlusconi I	AN	1994	251	4	5	19.2 %	Agriculture and Forest Environment Culture Post and Telecommunications Transport
	LN				5	19.2 %	Budget Industry Interior Institutional Reforms EU policies
	FI				9	34.6%	Prime Minister Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Defence Public Works University and Scientific research Civil Service and Regional Affairs

							Family and Social Affairs Relationship with the parliament
Prodi I	PDS (dem left)	1996			10	45.4%	Vice-PM, Cultural Resources, Sport & Entertainment Finance Industry, Trade, Artisan, craft and Tourism Interior and civil protection Transport and Navigation Public Education and University Social Solidarity Equal opportunity Public administration and regional affairs Relationship with the parliament
	FdV				1	4.5%	Environment
D'Alema I	FdV	1998			2	7.4 %	Environment Equal opportunity
	PDS				8	29.6%	Prime Minister Finance Labour and Welfare Industry, Trade and Arts and crafts Public Education Foreign Trade Cultural Resources and Activities Social Solidarity
D'Alema II	FdV	1998			2	7.7 %	Environment Equal opportunity
	PDS				9	34.6 %	Prime Minister Finance Labour and Welfare Transport Public Education Foreign Trade Public Administration Social Solidarity
Berlusconi II	LN				3	12.0 %	Justice Labour & Social Policies Institutional reform and devolution
	FI				10	40.0 %	Prime Minister Interior Economy & Finance Production activities Defence Cultural Resources Government Programme Achievement Public Administration Regional Affairs Equal opportunity

Netherlands Balkenende I	LPF	2002			2	18.0 % *	Deputy PM / Health, Welfare and Sport Transport and Public Works Economic Affairs Foreigners and Integration
Switzerland Villiger	SVP	1995			1	14.3	Public Works
Delamuraz	SVP	1996			1	14.3 %	Defence
Koller	SVP	1997			1	14.3 %	Defence
Cotti	SVP	1998			1	14.3 %	Defence
Dreifuss	SVP	1999			1	14.3 %	Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
Ogi	SVP	2000			1	14.3 %	Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
Leuenberger	SVP	2001			1	14.3 %	Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
Villiger	SVP	2002			1	14.3 %	Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
Couchepin	SVP	2003			1	14.3 %	Defence, Civil Protection and Sport

* Two ministers resigned and were not replaced in October 2002.

Source: Woldendorp et al. , 2000; EJPR – Political Data Handbook: Various issues.

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