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**WORKSHOP 4A
DO EU INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES “PRODUCE” EUROPEAN IDENTITY?**

**The Common Foreign and Security Policy as a Source of European Identity.
Analysis through a Comparative Study
of Some Non-aligned EU Member-States' Security Identity**

Sophie ENOS ATTALI (PhD Candidate, Sciences Po, Paris)

According to Vivian Schmidt¹, when analysing the nature of the actions undertaken at the European level in the framework of the European Union (EU), it is possible to distinguish communitarian actions that impose strict and detailed rules of application, implying a significant amount of coercion to adjustment at the national level, from decisions that leave more freedom to the national governments concerning the means used to attain a common goal. Logically, it seems at first glance that the type of decisions that may contribute the most to produce European identity may be the more constraining decisions, since national governments may feel more implied in them; on the opposite, it appears quite unlikely that an intergovernmental EU policy such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can produce European identity, if we admit European identity has something to do with the social feeling of membership to the EU and of difference towards the members of entities other than the EU.

As a matter of fact, the CFSP, which was set up as a pillar of intergovernmental cooperation, depends essentially on the States for its definition². Since the mode of decision-making is the rule of unanimity or constructive abstention, nothing is forced on the States. As well, if the President of the Council and the General Secretary of the Council of Ministers (who as the High Representative for the CFSP³ is charged with the coordination of all external policy of the EU) are responsible for monitoring the CFSP, concretely, the latter, being named unanimously by the European Council, acts more often than not in the name of the Council and at the explicit request of its President. Given the limited powers conceded to communitarian institutions and the weak degree of coercion the EU is able to exercise in the domain of foreign and security policy, although the Treaty on European Union asserts that the implementation of CFSP “will reinforce the European identity”, it seems difficult to refer to the CFSP as something inducing the EU member States to feel involved in Europe so much that they identify themselves with the European fate.

Still, beyond these theoretical considerations based on the functioning of the second pillar of the European Union, it is necessary to check if, in practice, an intergovernmental policy such as the CFSP does really not produce European identity. We will particularly pay attention to the impact of the CFSP on domestic

¹ V. Schmidt, “Europeanization and the mechanics of economic policy adjustment”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. IX, n° 6, 2002, pp. 894-912.

² Title V of the Treaty on the EU (articles J to J 11).

³ Article 26 of the EU Treaty revised at Amsterdam.

identities. To achieve such a goal, we intend examining whether the national security identities of EU member-States are impregnated with EU's security conceptions and so translate a deep feeling of membership to the EU. Our study will particularly focus on the national security identity of some so-called "neutral" or non-aligned EU member-States that are Austria, Finland and Sweden. The choice of such countries is guided by the fact that neutrality and non-alignment are security postures deeply anchored in national traditions: usually understood as an instrument of national independence, as a demonstration of State sovereignty, neutrality and, with it, non-alignment, often form an element of national security identity in the countries that refer themselves to this type of security posture; with the result that the national security identity of neutral States usually appears as quite impervious to all external pressures and traditionally conveys a deep will to remain completely independent⁴. Considering that, it seems to us particularly appropriate to observe so-called 'neutral' EU member-States' security identity in order to determine if the CFSP produces or not European identity.

The main argument of this presentation is that the EU permeates more and more the national security identity of its member-States, without meaning yet a complete disappearance of national security identities. Our feeling is that this is due to the specific functioning of the EU, which influences and, as well, is influenced by its member-States at a cognitive level.

Methodological premises: how to evaluate the influence of the CFSP on EU member-States' national security identity?

Before entering into the analysis properly, it is necessary to point out the conceptual and methodological scope as well as the specific circumstances with which this study fits in.

The theoretical context: a constructivist approach of security identity

The topic of this inquiry is the formation, through the CFSP, of a European identity in the sphere of security and defence. Hence, the study requires an approach which accounts for the process of non-national identity formation. Consequently, it applies social constructivism as an analytical frame of reference⁵.

The constructivist perspective proves to be suitable since it problematises the notion of identity when studying political entities and processes in international politics. It also does not emphasise any level of analysis - nation State or international system -, but rather examines the "fabric", the formative features (identity and interests) of political entities. Additionally, it is a theory equipped to examine the dynamism of the processes in international politics as it contends that the core properties of political subjects (identity and interests) are results of knowledgeable, interactive and inter-subjective practices, and focuses upon the

⁴ As Unger and van Waarden explain: "because much of policy substance, form and outcome is linked to national cultures and institutions which are strongly rooted in history, they will be rather persistent over time". Cf. B. Unger, F. van Waarden, *Convergence or Diversity? Internationalization and Economic Policy Response*, Avebury, Aldershot, 1995.

⁵ Social constructivist concepts and theses applied here draw on the following works: Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Jeffrey Checkel, *Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions*, University of Oslo, ARENA Working Paper n° 24, 1999; J. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe", *International Studies Quarterly*, n° 43, 1999, pp. 83-114; J. Checkel, *International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe*, University of Oslo, ARENA Working Paper n° 11, 2001; Marcussen, Risse, Engelman-Martin, Knopf, Roscher, "Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. VI, n° 4, 1999, pp. 614-633.

dynamics of these practices: according to social constructivists, actors' identities are not given and fixed, but are constructed by social interactions⁶. So, the constructivist approach appears to us as much appropriate to study something which is in the process of construction, as it is the case of the European identity.

The notion of identity applied here entails a set of principles, objectives, and ideas of purpose. It further is produced and reproduced in an interactive and cognitive process. In fact, there are two layers in the understanding of the concept of identity. Self-determination in terms of underlying ideas, norms, and aims is the first element. Identity also is thought of as intentional actions, through which this self-definition is produced and reproduced. The former definitive element in identity definition is the factor of stability whereas the latter one determines the dynamics in the process of identity formation. Identity, thus, is a socially constructed phenomenon. Furthermore, the institutions and the process of institutionalisation are attributed a key explanatory role in the account of the construction of identity. In essence, the construction of identity is interrelated with the institutionalisation of the core principles and objectives, with their "embeddedness" into the institutional system. The institutions further act as promoters of norms, values, and aims through their policies and have a central role in the affirmation and adaptation of identity characteristics. Thus, following the constructivist approach of identity, we will consider here identity as a social and historical construction, based on perceptions and values embedded in an institutional system.

As for security identity, its definition has something to do with the links that may exist between identity and security. The works on the relation between identity and security⁷ underscore three different types of links between the two elements: 1) identity may legitimate a security policy and be used as a tool of mobilization of a given society towards security ends; 2) the norms and values combined with the security of a society may be so much internalized that they form an element of the definition of this society; 3) the way a society perceives the threats hanging over it and defines its security choices may be partly determined by the identity of this society. On the basis of these statements, we will consider here security identity as a set of values, norms and perceptions which, at least on the surface (that is to say in the discourses and so in the image presented to the others), frame the security policy: as U. Sedelmeier suggests it, norms, values and perceptions regarding foreign and security policy are "expressions of which foreign policy goals and foreign policy practices [an entity] consider[s] legitimate, given [its] particular collective identity[y] or self-images".

Following this idea, we admit, with O. Waever, that the definition of security constitutes an act of language⁸; we believe that official discourses, indicating the values, norms and perceptions of reference for a security policy, play a significant role in the construction of security identity. Hence, we consider it's possible to go into the security identity of a State through the study of the security doctrine of this State, since a security doctrine precisely usually reflects the values, norms and perceptions on which a security policy is based.

⁶ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

⁷ Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity. Social Constructs and International Systems*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1999 ; Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interest. A Sociology of International Relations*, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999 ; Peter J. Katzenstein (dir.), *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1996.

⁸ O. Waever, "Security analysis. Conceptual apparatus", in B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 21-47.

Thus, to evaluate the impact of the CFSP and, more generally of the EU on national security identities, it seems necessary to look, inside national security doctrines, for norms, values or perceptions possibly inspired by the EU and more precisely by the CFSP.

The possible input of the EU on national security identities: the values, norms and perceptions spread by the CFSP

The signs of an influence of the EU and of the CFSP on national security identity not only consist in direct evocations of the EU and of the CFSP, but also in references to some of the elements which constitute the CFSP and the security identity of the EU, that is to say the perceptions, norms and values on which the EU bases its security policy. So, before going into national security identities and looking in them for an EU influence, it is necessary to remind the principles, norms and values at the basis of the CFSP and also the relevant characteristics of the EU regarding European foreign policy, through a review of the Treaty on the European Union, as well as of the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003.

The Union declares its role in international affairs as a promoter of international peace and security, liberty, rule of law, human rights and democracy, as well as regional cooperation⁹. Concerning security, it considers the new threats it has to deal with as more diversified, less obvious and less foreseeable than the conventional threats and aims in particular at fighting terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime as well as regional conflicts.

The EU declares itself an actor working for multilateral, order-ruled world under the authority of the UN and in cooperation with the OSCE and NATO. In connection with that, it is necessary to precise that the EU defines itself as something different from NATO and, at the same time, not so much as an alternative to NATO, but rather as something complementary to it: at first, different from NATO, because it doesn't aim to reach a balance of military forces, but is rather based on cooperative security; secondly, as a complement to NATO since, on one hand, it is closely interconnected to NATO in terms of elaboration and validation of targets and capabilities, of organisation and institutions, and of capabilities and assets, and on the other hand, in the sphere of post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention, it has a comprehensive approach in building civilian capabilities and its "philosophy" in civilian crisis management is distinctive, compared to peace building activities with subcontractors¹⁰.

Thus, the goals the CFSP assigns to its military and civilian capacities mainly are missions of conflict prevention and crisis management (the so-called Petersberg tasks consist in humanitarian and rescue tasks, tasks of crisis management, including combat force deployment, and peace-keeping and peace-making), which are understood as taking the form not only of military actions but also and even principally of political, diplomatic and trading actions.

Through this review of the norms, values and perceptions underlying the CFSP and the European security strategy, the EU appears to be a "normative

⁹ I. Manners, "Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. XL, n° 2, p. 234-258.

¹⁰ This observation refers to the approach to post-war reconstruction, demonstrated in the current American occupation of Iraq.

power”¹¹, a sort of civilian power, which works for the spreading of some values and is ready to use military means only towards conflict prevention and crisis management goals. Defining security in a broad and comprehensive way, which includes the promotion not only of peace but also of democracy and human rights, the EU describes its missions, which consist mainly in civilian actions towards conflict prevention and crisis management, as coming within the framework of the United Nations and considers they may be realized in cooperation with multilateral and regional organizations.

After having recalled the main elements constitutive of the CFSP, it is possible to look for references to the CFSP in EU member-States’ security doctrines.

The signs of a European security identity in Austria, Finland and Sweden

Referring to a posture of impartiality adopted by States towards belligerents so as not to be involved in any conflict, neutrality theoretically implies a complete independent security policy. At the cognitive level, this takes the form of a claim of total independence: hence, until their entrance into the EU in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden all considered their posture of neutrality as the basis of their security identity and, so, all insisted on their freedom of action and more or less did not refer to anything else than the United Nations in their security doctrines.

But, things have been changing little by little since 1995, conveying an evolution of the security identity of the three countries. Is it possible to ascribe this evolution to the membership of the European Union and, more specifically, to the participation to the CFSP? Before answering this question, we intend examining the evolution of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish security doctrines, with a particular attention for the direct as well as indirect references to the EU and to the norms, values and perceptions underlying the CFSP.

In the three countries considered here, we can note a direct reference, in the discursive presentation of security policy, to the EU as the main framework of security. For example, the Austrian security and defense doctrine adopted in 2001 states that “Austria’s vital security interests and the security interests pursued in common with the EU constitute the basis of our security policy. [...] The security of Austria and that of the EU are inseparably linked [...] Peace and stability in Europe are based on co-operation among European states in the framework of various security organizations [...] For the future of Europe, the evolution of the EU and of NATO in terms of security policy will specifically be of vital significance”. Finland also describes the European Union as the main factor of security in Europe: “membership of the Union, which is based on solidarity and mutual commitments in all areas, serves to enhance Finland’s security.” Comparatively, Sweden asserts, in the presentation of its foreign and security policy made by the government in February 2005: “the EU’s ability to propagate [...] values [such as democracy, economic development, respect for human rights and the rule of law] is the foremost contribution to security in Europe”. So, the three countries consider the European Union as a contributor to their own security and mention it in their security doctrine.

In connection with these references to the EU as an important contributor to their own security, the three countries emphasize the concepts of solidarity and cooperation, particularly in the European context, in place of their traditional security

¹¹ H. Sjørnsen, “Security and defence”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjørnsen, Brian White (ed.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: Sage Publishers, 2004, p. 68.

posture, that is to say their neutrality: hence, Austria, Finland and Sweden don't consider anymore themselves as neutral, but rather describe their posture as one of non-alignment, that is to say of non-participation to military alliances. This major change signals, if not a complete breach of their traditional security identity, at least an evolution of it, which takes the form of a distance from the traditional basis of their security identity in favor of security cooperation, particularly in Europe.

In such a situation, it doesn't appear so surprising to note an assertion of the direct link between the new national conception of security and the security conception spread at the European level. Hence, Austria clearly states that, nowadays, it "implements its security policy essentially within the framework of the EU". In the same way, Finland openly asserts the influence of the European Union on its security doctrine: "the European Union's security strategy, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003, and the provisions applying to the common security and defense policy in the Constitutional Treaty, which was approved by the European Council in June 2004, have created in an important way the framework and starting points for drawing up Finland's own lines of actions". As far as Sweden is concerned, it doesn't really describe the EU as something framing its security policy, but voices a deep will to strengthen the security means of the EU.

Thus, the way Austria, Finland and Sweden describe their new security environment is very close to the descriptions inscribed in the Treaty on the European Union and in the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003. Hence, Austria considers threats consist less in interstate wars than in "international terrorism, trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings, migration flows [...], environmental disasters, and economic and financial crises". In the same way, Finland also considers its security "is increasingly influenced not only by military but also economic and political developments in Europe and globally" and describes "the key threats affecting" its security as "terrorism, [...] proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and [...] use of military force, organized crime, drugs and human trafficking, economic and technological risks, environmental problems, population growth, population migrations and epidemics". Sweden also thinks that threats such as "natural disasters and environmental degradation, poverty and pandemics, terrorism and organized crime, failing States and regional conflicts, war and weapons of mass destruction" require a "broadened concept of security". So, Austria, Finland and Sweden have a same perception of the security environment and this perception is similar to the one developed at the European level: like the EU, they securitize issues of non-military nature.

Besides, comparatively to the EU, the three countries think the answers to the new threats must not only be military ones. Hence, Austria agrees with the idea according to which the instruments of security policy are not only of military nature, but also consist in "police, intelligence, economic, social, educational, cultural, informational and communicational, ecological and internal security instruments". As for Finland, if it still bases its line of action on "a credible national defense, the functioning of society, a consistent foreign policy [...] a strong international position and an active participation as a member of the EU", at the same time, it endeavors "to strengthen multilateral cooperation, the UN and international law and to govern globalization in order to increase security by reducing inequality and exclusion" and "emphasizes the responsibility of the international community in preventing crises and humanitarian disasters and in protecting the civilian population". Comparatively, Sweden insists on its contribution to the promotion of peace, on the necessity to strengthen the capacity of the international community to tackle the new challenges,

on the need for a stronger international legal system and describes the effective countermeasures against most of the new threats as the spreading of “democracy, economic development and respect for human rights and the rule of law throughout Europe”.

Moreover, the three countries advocate a development of the EU security capacity to deal with the new security challenges. Austria’s security policy is said to be shaped in accordance with the principle of supporting “EU reforms, especially with a view to developing the CFSP/ESDP and safeguarding the Union’s security interests”. In the same way, Finland asserts it works “to strengthen the European Union as a security community and an international actor”, particularly by supporting “the Union’s enlargement process, neighborhood policy and the development of justice and home affairs as principal factors promoting security”, as well as the strengthening and the implementation of the “EU’s common foreign and security policy and common security and defense policy”. Asserting the need “to strengthen European cooperation to meet” the new threats, Sweden advocates the development of the EU as a security actor, insisting in particular on the necessity for the EU to work for more transparent and more equitable world trade rules, for an ambitious refugee policy, for the promotion of peace and crises management, for the establishment of civilian rapid reaction units or for a better information exchange between EU member-States.

Finally, as far as the relation between the EU and NATO is concerned, the three countries, which are not members of NATO but, as participants to the Partnership for Peace, consider it as an important security actor, contributing efficiently to peace and stability in the world, advocate for cooperation between the two organizations, “in a spirit of global responsibility, shared basic values and respect for international law” (Finnish doctrine).

The Austrian, the Finnish and the Swedish security doctrines have been changing since the entrance of the three countries into the EU, signaling an evolution of the security identity of the three countries in a European sense, since the need of European cooperation is emphasized and some elements of the CFSP, as well as of the European Security Strategy are referred to. Yet, is it possible to see in such a phenomenon an impact of the CFSP and, more broadly, of the EU, while some of these elements don’t look like specifically “European”?

The CFSP, a filter of European identity

When examining the security identity of some EU member-States which are supposed to prone a complete independence and to be quite impervious to external pressure, we can be surprised by the big number of references to the EU and to the European security cooperation and, with them, to the norms and values constituting the CFSP, present in the security doctrines of these countries. How to explain such a phenomenon, while, in itself, as explained in introduction, the CFSP does not have any coercive force on EU member-States?

Following the idea according to which “agents are bound by structures, but they are also capable through action of altering the structural environment in which they operate, albeit in ways that may be structurally contained”¹², we will consider here the process of interaction at work in the Common Foreign and Security Policy-making, by taking into account the impact of CFSP processes on national systems,

¹² B. Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, London: Palgrave, 2000, p. 172.

as well as the flow of influence from member-States to the CFSP-making. According to us, the European impregnation of the national security identity of the EU member-States has something to do with the way the CFSP functions.

Although there is no specific structure to diffuse models of actions and norms of reference regarding foreign and security policy within the EU, we think that the EU and, within it, the CFSP, constitutes what R. L. Jepperson and *al* call a “cultural environment”, that affects the behavior of its member-States as well as their basic characteristics, that is to say their identity¹³. Firstly, the EU appears as a cultural environment through the norms, values and goals it spreads: through the ratification of the constituting treaties of the EU, member-States agreed upon common values, principles, perceptions and goals defined in terms of Common Foreign and Security Policy in the domain of security; in that way, the EU appears as the originator of a European model. If we admit, with M. G. Cowles and T. Risse, that “the creation of norms at the European level serves as important focal points around which [...] discourses and identities are fashioned”¹⁴, then we can consider that the inscription of common goals regarding foreign policy and security in the Treaty on European Union and in the European security strategy contributes to structuring national debates and so can explain the mention of the EU as a security factor in national security doctrines: as K. Smith argues, “once the objectives [to promote certain norms] are adopted at the EU level, the member-States become involved in a process in which their initial preferences are reshaped”¹⁵. Moreover, as K. E. Jorgensen states it, “States might formally be in control of decision-making but processes of socialization and institutional dynamics are responsible for a number of significant outcomes” and that constitutes what he calls “European governance in the field of foreign policy”¹⁶. Hence, in the framework of the CFSP, national elites involved in security policy have many occasions to discuss on security: through their meeting, may they be informal or official, national decision-makers as well as experts exchange their ideas and may adjust themselves around certain shared cognitive concepts, as, for example, a same way to perceive the new threats hanging over the whole continent. Such a form of transfer of ideas is facilitated by the recent creation of permanent advisory bodies that bring together elites of the different EU member-States¹⁷: such bodies “transform governance from intergovernmental bargaining to supranational deliberation”¹⁸. By introducing and coordinating meetings of experts and political leaders from all the member-States, by facilitating contacts, by creating occasions of forums of discussions, the CFSP produces networks and, through them, gives rise to a process of transnational cooperation¹⁹ that favors the emergence of a

¹³ R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, P. Katzenstein, “Norms, identity, and culture in national security”, in P. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 33.

¹⁴ M. G. Cowles and T. Risse, “Transforming Europe: Conclusions”, in J. Caporaso, M. G. Cowles, T. Risse (ed.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 219.

¹⁵ K. Smith, “Conceptualising the EU’s international identity: *sui generis* or following the latest trends?”, paper presented at the ECPF European Union Politics Conference, Bordeaux, 26-28 September 2002, quoted from U. Sedelmeier, “Collective identity”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, Brian White (ed.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: Sage Publishers, 2004, p. 132.

¹⁶ K. E. Jorgensen, “Poco: the diplomatic republic of Europe”, in K. E. Jorgensen (ed.), *Reflective approaches to European governance*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, p. 168.

¹⁷ In particular, Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of 15 ambassadors representing the member States and one representative of the Commission, and the Military Committee, that brings together the Military Chiefs of Staff represented by their permanent delegates.

¹⁸ H. Sjursen, “Security and Defence”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, Brian White (ed.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: Sage Publishers, 2004, p. 59.

¹⁹ Following K. Holzinger and C. Knill, we consider that the mechanism of transnational cooperation rests on the regular interaction, on the transnational level, between elites and national experts that seek, together, to find

European security identity. After M.G. Cowles and T. Risse's words, we can say that a process of Europeanization takes place through the CFSP, which contributes to "[the construction of] systems of meanings and [of] collective understandings, including social identities"²⁰.

Such an impact of the EU and, within it, of the CFSP, is probably facilitated by the participation of the member-States to the shaping of the CFSP. Hence, following the liberal approach according to which the identity of an international organization reflects the common traits of the identities of the member-States of this organization²¹, we consider that the CFSP, far from being the result of decisions taken at a supranational level, is, as an intergovernmental policy, the product of the contributions of all EU member-States and, as such, is deeply influenced by the national security identities of EU member-States. This phenomenon appears clearly in some of the provisions of the CFSP, which, hence, are the result of some so-called "neutral" member-States' interventions. For example, during the IGC of Amsterdam, in April 1996, Finland and Sweden published a common memorandum, in which they suggested a solution to deepen the CFSP in a way compatible with their special situation of non-aligned: whereas Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain had proposed to integrate the Western European Union (WEU), a European military alliance, into the European Union, what was perceived by the neutral States as a violation of their national security identity, Helsinki and Stockholm suggested to limit the project to the possibility, for the EU, to realize, in the frame of the CFSP, on the basis of a UN or OSCE mandate, the so-called Petersberg Tasks of the WEU, that is to say humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping missions and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making missions. This proposal was clearly aimed at avoiding any provision of collective defence and so at enabling neutral countries to take part actively and as equals to the other member-States to the decision-making and to the realization of these missions, without obliging these countries to violate their national security tradition of non-alliance. The Finno-Swedish initiative was successful, since the Petersberg Tasks were included in the Amsterdam Treaty. Through it, the CFSP is imbued with aspects of the national security identity of some EU member-States and that probably facilitates the spreading, in the national security doctrines of the EU member-States, of the cognitive content of the CFSP. Comparatively, in December 2003, during the IGC of Brussels designed to settle the Constitutional Treaty project proposed by the Convention on the Future of Europe a few months before, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden made a joint proposal on the mutual defence issue aimed at facilitating the up-holding of their traditional security posture: whereas it had been suggested to modify article I-40§7 so as all the EU member-States commit themselves to help and sustain each other mutually in case of an armed aggression against one of them, the four non-allied countries suggested an alternative solution, which appeared as less restricting since it was deprived of any obligation of assistance (*"if a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with*

policy solutions. Cf. Holzinger, K. et Knill, C. (mars 2003) « Explaining Cross-national Policy Convergence : Concepts, Causes, and Conditions », non published.

²⁰ M. G. Cowles and T. Risse, "Transforming Europe: conclusions", in J. Caporaso, M. G. Cowles, T. Risse (ed.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 219.

²¹ T. Risse-Kappen, "Collective identity in a democratic community: the case of NATO", in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 357-399; U. Sedelmeier, "Collective identity", in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjørnsen, Brian White (ed.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: Sage Publishers, 2004, p. 126.

*Article 51 of the UN Charter*²²); in the end, this proposal was not retained, but the final and definitive version of the Constitutional Treaty, as agreed on the 18 June 2004, provides that: “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”²³. Through their initiatives, the neutral EU member-States have put a parcel of their own security identity in the CFSP; thus, they have contributed to the shaping of the EU security identity, assuring that this fully respects their specific identity of non-aligned.

According to us, this dynamic process of interaction, achieved through mutual influences, enables the CFSP to contribute to the emergence of a European identity: on one hand, through its existence and its specific functioning, the CFSP facilitates meetings at the European level and thus constitutes an occasion, for European leaders, to agree on a common definition of the European security identity; on the other hand, appearing as a compromise between the national security identity of all EU member-States, this European security identity impregnates easily, almost naturally, the national security doctrines of the EU member-States, which can't oppose any resistance to something they have contributed to shape and which, so, is supposed to convey their own conceptions of security.

Conclusion

This study aimed at establishing whether the CFSP could be considered as a source of European identity. Considering CFSP as “a collective process that goes beyond intergovernmental boundaries”²⁴, we have tried to show that, if the CFSP, having no coercive impact on the EU member-States, does not produce in itself a European security identity, at the same time, it has an impact on the national level, which deals with values, norms and perceptions.

Thanks to its original functioning, which encourages the networking of elites and experts at the community level, the CFSP facilitates voluntary processes of exchange between European countries and so constitutes a framework voicing a European response to contextual constraints; as such, it contributes to the emergence of a European identity, this identity being the result of a compromise between norms, values and perceptions which characterize the national security identity of the EU member-States. So, whereas it is not possible to describe the CFSP as the producer of a European security identity, nevertheless it seems possible to assert that the CFSP intervenes in the process of emergence of a European security identity. Under this angle, the CFSP appears as a catalyst that activates the emergence of a European security identity, as well as a filter that underscores the principles, values and general orientation on which this European security identity may be based. Although it is not supranational and, as such, has no coercive force on the EU member-States, it frames the interpretation, by the member-States, of their strategic environment and impregnates the elaboration of national security doctrines,

²² The proposal was made through a letter dated 4 December 2003 and signed by Erkki Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Brian Cowen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria and Laila Freivalds, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden.

²³ Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. I-40§7.

²⁴ B. White, “Foreign policy analysis and the new Europe”, in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen, B. White (ed.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: SAGE Publishers, 2004, p. 23.

thus contributing to the spreading of a European dimension in the national security identities, with the result that the security identity of each EU member-State individually is impregnated with European elements.